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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The 1930s was a time of tremendous change and
upheaval for both Europeans and Americans. Nazi Germany was
both the cause and determiner of many of these changes. What
were American reactions to these changes? This is a paper
about liberal American attitudes toward Germany in the
inter-war years,

particularly during the years from the rise

of Nazism in 1933 to the beginning of World War II in 1939.
By examining The Nation's reactions to Hitler, Nazi Germany,
and their policies, an understanding can be gained of how it
effectively dealt with the ferment of the 1930s.
The Nation is important to focus upon and study on
two accounts.

First of all, although there may be no

specific representative of the liberal press,
foremost among liberal periodicals.

Nation was

It was a widely read

opinion maker whose influence went much further than its
numbers in circulation would indicate.

Secondly, The Nation

demonstrated its ability to integrate its liberal beliefs
with its reactions to Hitler and Nazi Germany.
sense,

h

In this

Nation is representative of the turmoil liberal

thinkers of the 1930s underwent in their coming to grips

1

2
with Nazism and its repercussions for Europe and the United
States.
The impact and aftermath of World War I led to the
development of divergent strands of liberal thought. Some
thinkers supported pacifism, others came to accept
isolation, and still other liberals adopted collective
security. Some judged it necessary to accept and support the
Soviet Union while other liberals could not. Although
liberals disagreed on the course of action to take in
response to Nazism, they shared a common abhorrence and
rejection of the policies and actions of the German National
Socialists. No one has ever had to deal with the likes of
Hitler and as a result, some liberals had difficulties
accepting the truth about Nazi policies and actions. Instead
they clung to their intellectual beliefs, which were quickly
shown to be outdated and inadequate. The problems liberals
confronted in corning to terms with Hitler were reflective of
the same kinds of difficulties the American public had in
responding to Hitler's dictatorship. Some liberals, however,
were able to see the truth about Nazism and cope with the
upheavals Hitler triggered without violating their liberal
beliefs. The Nation is an excellent source because it was
foremost among these progressive thinkers.
How The Nation viewed and reacted to Hitler and the
Nazis was mainly determined by its liberal view point. A
brief history of The

~~~~,

its founder, editors, and basic
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concerns will provide a perspective on its attitudes and
concerns toward Nazi Germany.
The Nation was first published on July 6, 1865, by
its founder and first editor, Edwin Lawrence Godkin. A
publisher's prospectus listed the objectives of the newly
formed Nation. Three were directed at the advancement of
freedom and civil rights in the South. The other goals were
"the accurate discussion of public affairs, the diffusion of
democratic principles, an emphasis on the importance of
public education and an art and literacy criticism."l Though
the emphasis varied with each editor, The Nation,
consistently, kept to its objectives. Godkin was greatly
influenced by the liberal thought of his day and it had been
his intention to found a liberal non-partisan weekly.
Godkin's ambition was fulfilled by Th

Nation as "its

standard of judgment through out all its history has been
its conception of that congeries commonly referred to as
'liberalism' .,,2
What does liberalism mean in terms of the kinds of
issues The Nation was concerned with? First of all, liberal
thought is rooted in a main endeavor which strives for, as
its chief aim, the happiness, freedom, and progress of all

lAlan Pendelton Grimes, The Political Liberalism 0
The New York Nation (Bloomington:-Indiana University Press,
1965-)-,-p. vii.
2 Ibid .• p. v.
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mankind. American liberalism, in addition, counts as one of
its tenets the concept of individuality. According to
liberal ideas, the success or failure of a society can be
measured by how well individuals attain their fullest
potential. American liberalism is also identified with the
defense of individual civil liberties, which translates to
the defense of the minorities of a nation. The liberal
concept of liberty includes every single aspect of human
life. Freedom of thought, expression, and opportunity are
important liberties. American liberals have been advocates
for these essential liberties. In fact,

liberalism

has demanded a positive program of governmental action
to provide the conditions--economic, political, and
other--which would give the common man the opportunity
to realiz the essential dignity to which he is
entitled. 3
All of the forgoing tenets of liberalism were
adhered to by

he Nation in its pages and it viewed itself

as the defender of liberties not only in the United States
but throughout the world. The principles of liberalism were
used as the standard by which everything was analyzed in The
Nation. 4 That is why in 1919, the weekly advertised itself
as "the foremost exponent of uncompromising liberalism in

3D • Joy Humes, Oswald Garrison Villard, Liberal of
the 1920's (Binghampton: Syracuse University Press, 1960--r;p. 21.

4 Alan Pendelton Grimes, The Political
The New
Nation, pp. v, ix.

Of

S

America."S Liberalism was an important element of the
character of The Nati n's new owner and editor,
Garrison Villard,
Karl L.
1928,

Oswald

who took possession of the weekly in 1918.

Bickel, President of the United Press,

declared,

in

that Villard's Nation was "[t]he best obtainable

barometer on the state of the liberal opinion in the United
States.!!6 Villard, who was a graduate of Harvard,
himself as a crusading editor and,
Editor-in-chief, The

pictured

under his guidance as

was to achieve foremost

prominence in the United States as the conveyor of liberal
thinking.

Not only had the weekly gained the pinacle of its

notoriety under Villard,

but its influence as well.

Who was reading The Nation for it to achieve such
success and whom did it influence with its liberal opinions
and concerns? The Nation was written for a more educated
audience than the general masses and "it in part reflected,
in part stimulated,

but without doubt influenced the

political thinking of America.,,7 Writing in 1939, Professor
Arnold Thurman believed both The

tion and The New Republic

deserved high praise and laurels for
thought.

"In this country,

their place in American

periodical literature has been

SThe Nation 109 (October 2S,

1919):536.

6 Karl A. Bickel The Nation 147 (July 9, 1938):ii,
facing p. 53. cited in Alan Pendelton Grimes, Th
Political
Liberalism Of The New York Nation, p. ix.
7 Alan Pendelton Grimes, The Political Liberalism 0
The New York Nation, p. ix.
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more important than books and there have been more new
notions put across by these two publications than any other
two in the history of American letters.,,8
The Nation garnered such high praise because it had
tremendous influence upon liberal thinkers. In 1865, the
weekly started with a circulation of 5,000, and by 1928,
over 40,000 issues were being published each week. 9 During
the years of its publication, up to 1940, The Nation never
achieved a vast circulation, yet it was able to influence
important, prestigious people in the world: newspaper
writers, college professors, and government leaders. 10 The
journal, in addition, counted among its subscribers
libraries, universities, and other educational centers. The
Nation's contributors included such influential people as
Harold Laski, Ramsey McDonald, Archibald McLeish, William
Gram Summner, Stuart Chase, Freda Kirchwey, Bertrand
Russell, H. L. Mencken, Louis Fischer, Reinhold Niebuhr,
Thomas Mann, and many others.
Oswald Villard knew that The Nation was an
influential part of American journalism, and when he left

BArnold Thurman cited in Malcolm Cowley and Bernard
Smith, Books That Changed Our Minds, (New York: Doubleday,
Doran and Company, Inc., 1939), pp. 8-9.
9Michael Wreszin, OswRld Garrison Villard,
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 196.
lOSara Alpern, Fr
Kirchwey: A Woman
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p.

The
58.

n

7

the editorship in 1932, he wanted to insure the same high
standards for its future. He asked Freda Kirchwey to become
the executive editor of the editorial board. Villard
believed Kirchwey would carryon the traditions at the
weekly. Villard remained at The
"Issues and Men.

1f

on
----

writing his column,

Freda Kirchwey wanted to maintain the same

crusading nature of the journal. This was nothing new at the
weekly. "'From the days of Godkin down The Nation has in the
strictest sense been a propaganda journal. I mean simply a
journal devoted to fighting with words for the particular
set of beliefs which its editors and owners have held' .lfll
There was a continuance of the same liberal standard through
Kirchwey's fight against fascism. Even though Kirchwey
carried on in the same spirit, there was a difference in her
editorship. What was new in Kirchwey's use of The Nation was
the stress she placed on it as a way to fight fascism and
the ills it perpetuated. Kirchwey saw the fight against the
fascists as a moral issue. The struggle against fascism,

for

the new editor, was a battle between "Good and Evil." She
believed that if fascism won the battle, the world was
doomed. Kirchwey, therefore, envisioned the fight against

IlFreda Kirchwey, speech, August 30, 1939, p. 2,
#324, Freda Kirchwey papers Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe
College, MC 280 (hereafter cited as FK MSS) cited in Sara
Alpern, Freda Kirchwey, p. 100.
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the Nazis as her crusade to create hope for the world by the
"successful resistance to international fascism.,,12
So powerful was Kirchwey's desire to fight fascism,
Hitler, and the Nazis that it interfered with her judgment
of the Soviet Union's purges of 1934-38. Despite the
abhorrent actions of the Soviets, she continued to include
them as part of her collective security stance. The Nation,
however, was not a mirror of Freda Kirchwey's viewpoint. The
journal did not reflect only her views toward collective
security. The whole range of liberal thought from extreme
pacifism to a more militant collective security was
presented in many issues of The Nation. Most of the editors
at the weekly agreed with Kirchwey's assessment of
collective security. American neutrality policy was
supported by only one man, Villard. His disagreement with
Kirchwey and the other editors grew so intense that by late
1939, Villard was forced to resign.

In 1937, the weekly was

sold to KirchweYi as a consequence,

her views toward the

Soviet Union became more dominant in its pages.
The Nation's fight against fascism, Hitler, and the
Nazis during the inter-war years and the preponderance of
articles on the German situation is the main reason it was
chosen as the primary source for this paper. Issues of both
The Nation and The New Republic were examined for the years
l2Freda Kirchwey to Hugo Van Arx, March 18, 1938,
#108, FK MSS cited in Sara Alpern, Freda Kirchwey, p. 101.
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between 1933 to 1938.
easily outnumbered The New

Nation's articles and editorials
--"---

's output by a two to one

margin. A more radical publication, The New Hasses,
realized, in 1933, that

~ation

was leading the fight

against fascism in Germany. An appeal was made to the
readership of The N

"There are two things we can

do about the experience of the last six months in Germany.
One is to scream like the
Due to its high visibility on German fascism, The
Nation makes an excellent source. The weekly is rich in
material and its arguments are effectively presented in
several formats. Some articles are in depth analyses of Nazi
Germany and its policies while other articles are eyewitness
accounts. Several reporters were sent to Germany to observe
conditions first hand. Other articles were contributed by
people who had actual experiences in Germany. For example, a
memoir by a former concentration camp inmate was printed.
Letters from Germany, detailing German events and
atrocities, were printed in the pages of

Nation. In

addition, the journal presented its attitudes and views in
its editorials. Because The Nation printed such a variety of
reporting, its crusade against fascism is more persuasive.
All of The Nation's various forms of arguments, taken

13Scott Nearing, cited in "Against the
scist
Terror in Germany," The New Hasses (April, 1933), p. 12.
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together, were highly effective tools in Freda Kirchwey's
battle against the German fascists.
Analyses of the various issues presented in The
Nation reveal that the journal was concerned about several
aspects of

~azi

rule in Germany, Chapter II, of this paper,

summarizes the attitudes of The Nation toward Hitler's
corning to power in 1933, and the rulers of Nazi Germany. To
begin with, the conditions that allowed Hitler to establish
his dictatorship are accurately portrayed. In addition, the
journal believed the fascist rulers to be deplorable men
with no favorable personal characteristics. The weekly not
only wanted to expose Nazi leaders for the kind of men they
were, but it also desired to give its readers a view of the
kind of man and leader Hitler actually was. Hitler had
hypnotized the German people,

but The Nation was not taken

in by his effective rhetoric. This negative view of Hitler's
character did not mean, however, that The
underestimated Hitler's abilities. On the contrary, the
weekly understood what he was capable of in his rule. Hitler
was the true dictator of Germany's future and this was
portrayed by the journal with clarity.
The most destructive element of the Nazis was the
violent nature of their personalities and, hence, the savage
policies of the Third Reich. This argument is presented in
Chapter III. The Nation believed the Nazis abused many
people and persecuted various groups in Germany to cement

11

their dictatorship in place and to further their various
policies. The Nazis,

through legal means (by promulgation of

laws) and illegal methods (generally violent in nature),
were able to alter Germany to their desires and convictions.
In general, women, most political and cultural groups, and
minorities (especially the Jews) suffered the most under the
Nazis actions. The Nati n reported what happened to Nazi
victims, the humiliation and the atrocities they suffered.
One of the groups of people which suffered
considerably under Nazi rule was the workers of Germany.
Chapter IV presents a summary of The Nation's report of the
economic conditions in Germany during the inter-war years.
Though the Nazis were unsuccessful at first in changing the
economic conditions in Germany (which was what The Nation
expected), the Nazis were able to achieve success by
instituting full employment through their armament program.
The weekly contended that the workers gained no benefit from
any of the programs established by the NaziS. Only the state
benefited and, in this case, the state meant Nazism.
Individuals were not meant to benefit. Hitler instituted
other programs and policies to achieve his aspirations. The
Four-Year Plan, propaganda, heavy taxation of German
citizens, and an increased national debt were methods
utilized by Hitler to gain his goals. Hitler wanted a war
time economy and financial independence from other nations
to achieve his domestic and foreign policy aspirations. Th

12
Nation linked Germany's lack of essential raw industrial
resources to Nazi intent to seize regions and countries that
could supply the needed materials to equip the Third Reich
with the weaponry necessary for a highly mechanized war.
According to The Nation, Hitler needed the weaponry
that German industry could supply because of his ambitious
and aggressive foreign policy objectives. Chapter V is an
analysis of Hitler's goals and how he intended to execute
them. This chapter also summarizes the journal's response to
Hitler's foreign policy. Hitler intended to revise the
Treaty of Versailles. He wanted the regions and nations that
he believed were Germany's right.

he Nation realized Hitler

wanted to achieve his pan-Germanic empire as swiftly as
possible. The Third Reich began the process by pulling out
of the League and starting its armament program. Next,
Hitler marched his armies into the Rhineland and waited to
see if Germany was going to be successful in its attempts at
Anschluss with Austria.
If Hitler was to achieve all of his goals, Th
believed he would have to use additional methods for
his intended takeovers. Hitler used a couple of methods in
his attempts to carry out his plans. Nazi agents and
propaganda cells were recruited and organized to achieve
Hitler's goals.
The rest of Europe was unable to stop Hitler. The
Nation declared there was one answer to keeping the United

13
States out of the upcoming war.

Collective security,

expressed through economic sanctions and military
involvement,

if necessary,

at the journal.

was advocated by all except one

In addition,

collective security advocates

delineated their objections to neutrality.
Nation,

through Freda Kirchwey,

to advocating the need for

had

By 1939, The

progressed in its view

international military

conscription to halt German fascism.

The weekly asserted the

United States was in real danger from the Nazis;

therefore,

American national security became part of the concerns of
the weekly. The horrors and destruction that were occurring
in the rest of the world could easily entangle the U.S.

The

Nation did not want America sucked into the Nazi vortex
without preparation.

The

journal wanted the United States to

emerge victorious from any such contest.

The future of the

world was at stake. The Nation assumed the worst of the
National Socialists from the very moment they achieved power
in 1933.

CHAPTER II
TH

NATION'S ANALYSIS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE THIRD REICH AND ITS ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE NAZI LEADERSHIP

The Nation presented an accurate analysis of how
Hitler attained power and entrenched his dictatorship in
Germany in 1933. The times were indeed ripe for Hitler's
effective techniques and manipulation. The weekly, on many
different occasions, expressed its attitudes toward Hitler
as the man and the leader of Germany. There is much to be
learned from The Nation's attitudes toward Hitler and his
spawn, National Socialism, as well as the rest of the Nazi
leaders. The weekly saw no merit in Hitler's coming to power
as it was certain his rule would have a destructive impact
on Germany. The Germans' acceptance of Hitler was based on a
fabric of lies, but because of their national character
flaws,

they shared the responsibility with the Nazis for

following Hitler. The Nation did not accept that Hitler had
the proper character to lead. He was considered an
uneducated "barbarian" and the rest of the Nazis were
described in less generous terms as moral degenerates. It
was considered deplorable behavior when the Nazis lied about
their treatment of the Jews and to governments to further
14
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Nazi foreign policy goals. Though the journal was disgusted
by Hitler and his behavior, it did not underestimate him in
any way. The Nation did not consider him to be a dupe of any
one individual or group; instead, Hitler was the one in
complete control. Most of what was written in The Nation
about Hitler, the man, came from the early period of the
Third Reich and the time right before the war. The Nation
never praised Hitler in an unsparing manner, nor did it ever
want to validate any of his words and deeds. The Nation's
consideration of Hitler began when he took office and became
a menace to Germany.
The Nation examined how Hitler came to power in
1933. Germany,

in the early 1930s, was a country in turmoil

and, as a result, the Weimar Republic was in trouble. The
rise of fascism as a solution for Germany's problems was not
an inevitable outcome. It was the chance happening of people
and events that coincided with circumstances, set up by
history, that made Germany ripe for the fascists. Hitler was
appointed Chancellor of the Republic by President von
Hindenburg on January 30, 1933. He became the head of a
coalition government which seemed to be dominated by
conservatives. After the new government was formed, Hitler
demanded the right to hold new elections. The Chancellor
received his wish and the elections \.ere set for the fifth
of March. The Reichstag was dissolved on the first of
February, only two days after Hitler had assumed office.

16

During the election campaign, the Nazis openly utilized
terror tactics against all political opposition, especially
the communists and social democrats. However, it was the
burning of the Reichstag on the twenty-seventh of February
that allowed Hitler to further his quest for absolute power.
The Nazis arrested five men, who were alleged communists,
for the arson. A communist scare was fomented throughout
Germany by the

~azis.

President von Hindenburg was persuaded

by the cabinet to issue a decree which, in effect, abolished
basic rights conferred by the Weimar constitution. This
decree restricted the press and the activities of other
political groups. It, in effect, muzzled the communists and
the social democrats. In the plebiscite, on the fifth of
March, the Nazis gained only 43.9 per cent of the votes cast
by the Germans. It was only with the coalition of other
nationalists that the Nazis were able to gain a majority of
51.9 per cent.

1

With the promulgation of the Enabling Law on

the twenty-third of March, Hitler consolidated his powers
and a totalitarian regime was established in Germany.
The Nation argued that many events and circumstances
were behind the founding of a totalitarian Nazi regime in
1933. H. BrUning established a precedent for Hitler by
initiating a method for avoiding the Reichstag. The
President became the key. BrUning dissolved the Reichstag in

Allen

&

1 K• Hildebrand, T
Unwin, 1984), p.

Third Reich,

(Boston: George
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1930 and governed by decree. As a result, BrUning "became
responsible not to the will of the Reichstag but to the whim
of the President.,,2 Because of BrUning and his methods, it
therefore became possible for President von Hindenburg, an
ailing 86 year old suspected of senility, to appoint Hitler
to a position of power. In addition, Hitler would not have
been able to achieve control of Germany without the
existence of other conditions. One of these was the economic
situation in Germany.
In 1932, German economic conditions were appalling
as the Republic was one of the hardest hit by the
depression. Fully one-half of the German workshops and
businesses were closed and over one-third of the work force,
6 million, was out out of work with no prospect of a
change. 3 The Nation believed the socialists governments,
after the war, did not go far enough in their programs; they
were not thorough enough in their reorganization of the old
regime. Many reactionaries, imperialists, and militarists
were left behind in Germany and not replaced by the new
order. Also, the Treaty of Versailles, which was forced on
the Germans after their defeat in 1918, made governing for
the Weimar Republic more formidable. The collapse of the

Th

Nati

2John Gunther, "Who Killed the German Republic?,"
136 (May 10, 1933):527.

3"The German Republic Totters," The Nation 134 (June
22, 1932):695.
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Republic was a direct result of these factors which occurred
during the crucial years after 1918, according to The
tion. In summation, the weekly believed many factors were
responsible:
the economic distress; the sense of infinite wrong done
to Germany by the Treaty of Versailles; the false
accusation of sole responsibility for the war; the Ruhr
invasion; the frightful loss of wealth due both t& the
war and to the inflation, and many other factors.
These incidents contributed to the Republic's inability to
govern "plus the weakness of the government, the failure to
carry the revolution through with vigor, and the survival of
many militarists and monarchists are.

. the reasons why

the German Republic totters" and would, eventually, fail.

s

When Hitler won the elections in March 1933, a tone
was established by The Nation during this period that was to
be repeated over and over for the next few years. The weekly
saw no merit in Hitler's coming to power. Europe, as a
consequence, had gained another fascist dictator at the cost
of the freedoms of the German people. The Nation contended
"the only redeeming feature of this disaster to the
democratic and liberal movements is that he won the
Chancellorship by constitutional methods without resorting
to violence.,,6 This particular comment is not to be

6Editorial, "Hitler Hins,n The Nation 136 (March 15,
1933):277.

19
construed as a compliment. The journal believed Hitler to be
"incompetent to lead," because he knew nothing of financial
and economic issues. Hitler came to power because he
"deluded the masses who have looked upon him as a veritable
savior."? Hitler was no such person; in fact, the truth
could not be further from the Germans' perceptions. The
final analysis, for The Nation, came to whether the German
people would allow themselves to be intimidated "or will
rise against the most unprincipled demagogue yet to curse
Germany."S
Obviously the German people were not going to
immediately overthrow Hitler. After Hitler had been in power
for six months, The Nation analyzed the impact of the Nazis
on Germany. In so doing,

the weekly gave an open account of

its attitudes toward Hitler. It recognized Hitler to be
remarkable in at least one way; he persuaded the Germans to
vote away their freedoms. The establishment of totalitarian
regimes are common throughout history, "but never before has
a nation enjoying full right of speech thrown out its arms
to a tyrant and voluntarily riveted the chains about its own
neck." 9

9Harrison Brown, "Six Months of Hitlerism," The
Nation 137 (August 2, 1933):121.
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The German people believed in an aberration, who had
persuaded them to accept him for something he was not, a
leader. In these words The Nation described Germany's
attraction to Hitler. The German people's belief in Hitler
was based on more than a delusion as their faith in him was
founded on a fabric of lies. Hitler did better in this than
Hachiavelli could wish for.

"Never has there been a national

movement so entirely built upon falsehoods and never have
there been people so eager to swallow them as the exhausted
and ill-treated Germans."lO Hitler had the capacity to see
the attributes of the German people that he would be able to
manipulate. Despite this particular ability, Th

Nation did

not believe that Hitler was, in general, an educated or
civilized person, deserving of the leadership of Germany.
There were too many contradictions in Hitler's personality;
in fact, he was crude and somewhat illiterate. A reading of
Hitler's Mein Kampf would confirm these observations. The
Nation described Hitler's book as !'seven hundred leaden
pages of autobiography."ll It portrayed his book as a
"turgid mass of undigested history and personal selfrevelation which today cannot be quoted against him
with[out] deadly effect.

,,12 Not only did Hein Kampf

100swald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men: The Nazi
Child-Hind," The Nati n 137 (November 29, 1933):614.
llHarrison Brown, "Six Months of Hitlerism," p. l2l.
l2 Ibid •
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reveal much about Hitler's view of the world, it revealed
much about the man. Hitler did not have the character needed
to be the ruler of a great country. He was uncouth and
illfitted for the role. "Rarely indeed can one aspiring to
leadership so blatantly have dubbed himself an ignorant
barbarian.,,13
Hitler was a "barbarian." This explained much of his
behavior and his fellow Nazis' actions. In the process of
taking control of the government in 1933, Hitler overthrew
much of what Th

Nation valued in western civilization. The

weekly reacted to these Nazi atrocities toward humanity with
an almost palpable passion, rarely written with such
eloquence in Western journalism.
It is to be noted that an attack of unrivaled strength
and ferocity is being launched against the life of the
mind as such, against all intellectual values, against
all disinterestedness of thought, of research, of
aspiration, against the slowly won rights of the human
spirit and the freely functioning personality, against
every principle and every truth and every freedom that
men have lived for and often died for since the
Renaissance, against all that has constity~ed for so
long the very charter of humanity itself.
The "barbarians of the north" were perpetrating
these terrible crimes against humanity; what The Nation
valued in western culture was being destroyed. To uphold its
suppositions, the weekly quoted frequently from Hitler's

13 Ibid .
14Ludwig Lewisohn, "The New Kultur," The Nation 136
(June 21, 1933):696.
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autobiography. The evidence in his book revealed he would
purposely lie if it suited his purposes. The Nation
paraphrased Hitler's words in Mein Kampf to his followers,
"quite plainly in order to achieve power they are justified
in deceiving the German people and employing every form of
violence."

lS

Hitler's government lied about many issues, The

Nation insisted, by far the worst duplicity, on Hitler's
part, was over the Jewish question. 16 His government
consistently denied that Jews were being physically abused
or that their businesses were being confiscated and
destroyed by German agents. The government also attempted to
disassociate itself from any unpleasant incidents that
occurred during the early days of the Nazi regime. Jewish
survivors of atrocities committed in Germany were
interviewed by The Nation's reporters. In every single
instance, they reported, violence was committed by organized
bands of Nazis, and usually they were acting under orders.

17

The Nazi government "issues denials, punishes Jews for
spreading atrocity stories, expels honest correspondents,
and continues to encourage the very violence and

ISphilip S. Bernstein, "Can Hitler Be Trusted?,"
Nation 137 (December 27, 1933):728.
16 Ibid .
17Richard Neuberger, "The New Germany," The Nation
137 (October 4, 1933):376-79. and Philip S. Bernstein, "Can
Hitler Be Trusted?," p. 728.
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confiscation it is denying. fl18 Nurder, beatings, boycotts,
and confiscation of property continued in the Third Reich.
Apparently, Hitler learned he could not openly destroy a
minority without enraging world opinion. Instead, he
proceeded to crush the Jews and at the same time pacify
world opinion with his ludicrous denials.
Although the denial of atrocities committed against
Jews was part of Hitler's dishonesty, another side of his
duplicity became clear to The Nation after the Third Reich
began to fulfill its pan-Germanic policy. Hitler lied
repeatedly to the leaders of other nations about his
intentions toward the rest of Europe. He was not reliable;
his word had no credibility. Hitler was completely
"ruthless, and thinks no more of breaking a promise than he
would of breaking a kitten's back. All his moves are
calculated to achieve his objectives, and he is entirely
devoid of scruples.,,19 Hitler would lie to achieve his
goals, and he did so again and again. The Nation deplored
the attitudes and conduct of Hitler, in particular as he was
the leader of Germany. At times, the journal would vacillate
between hope that Hitler's actions would be minimized by
others, and acceptance of the consequences of his nature.

p.72S.

18philip S. Bernstein, "Can Hitler Be Trusted?,"

19 paul Y. Anderson, "It's All in 'Mein Kampf'," The
Nation 147 (October 8, 1938):343.
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This, to the contrary, did not mean that the journal
underestimated Hitler in any way.20 As early as 1934, The
Nation expressed the opinion that even though Hitler was not
what he seemed at times and that he was illiterate, he was
not an idiot or fool and no other group controlled him.
Many people, during the first couple of years of
Nazi rule in Germany,

believed Hitler was the dupe of one

group or another. If it was not the industrialists, then it
was the military command of Germany that controlled Hitler.
The Nation did not support either view. The most serious
supposition was that Hitler was commanded by the army or
that the Reichswehr would eventually overthrow him. "And I
am convinced that it is an illusion to count on the
overthrow of Hitler by the Reichswehr, and a mistake to
suppose that he in under the domination of the military
command.,,21 The military command probably needed Hitler more
than Hitler needed it. Even though the winter of 1934 was
evidently going to be a perilous one -with shortages of both
food and fuel--most Germans still supported Hitler. The
FUhrer was capable of this domination. "Hitler is really,
not merely nominally, the complete master of Germany and is
still the demi-god of the great majority of the German

20Louis Fischer, "Fascism and Bolshevism," The
Nation 138 (April 4, 1934):381.
21

Robert Dell, flThe Future of Hitler," The Nation
139 (September 19, 1934):321.
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people.,,22 The military command must have been cognizant of
this situation. The Nation's assessment of Hitler's mastery
of the Reichswehr came before the evidence fully supported
its supposition, as the army, later in 1938, was required to
swear allegiance to Hitler alone. Was any of the Nazi
leadership better than Hitler? The Nation discovered they
were as bad as Hitler.
The weekly had another source in its formation of
its opinion of Hitler and Nazism. It examined the rest of
the Nazi leaders for abilities to lead and command. One
could almost expect what The Nation believed these
"destroyers of Humanity," the Nazis, were like. The journal
did not mince words in its evaluation. "It is a horrifying
fact that Germany today is ruled by men of a type such as
have never before governed a great nation: drug addicts,
murderers, thieves, forgers, and moral decedents." 23 One
would think The Nation must be describing hooligans off the
street rather than the leaders of a prominent European
government. According to The Nation, these were not mere
words of abuse, these were terms that it asserted "describe
the commonly recognized character of most of the chief
leaders of the movement.,,24

22 Ibid .
23Harrison Brown, "Six Months of Hitlerism," p. 124.
24 Ibid .
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Most of the men, who followed Hitler, had lived on
the fringes of society after the war "exercising the only
trade they knew, hell-raising as outlaws.

.,,25 The

Nation did not hesitate to delve into their characters just
as it did with Hitler. Many of Hitler's cohorts were
military men, remnants of the war. Though some had not
served with the military, all were products of that era.
Hermann GHring, Aviation Minister of the Reich, had been a
war ace in the last war. However, this did not speak well
for GHring because "he is, like RHhm, accused of a secret
vice, morphinism, which, impressive documents are adduced to
show, once confined him in an asylum.

,,26 Many of his

other vices were well-known, including his liking of the
sumptuous life style. Ernst RHhm was leader of the SA
division of the Brown Army and Reich Minister without
portfolio. RHhm's drug addiction was notorious and so were
his sexual exploits with boys. Dr.

ul Josef Goebbles,

Propaganda Minister, "is no longer a man. He is a titan, a
god. His detractors are in jail and his play is performed,
to empty houses but to the frenzied applause of all
surviving drama critics.,,27
criticized Goebbles novel, Mi

ny of the critics who
were interred in prison

"
Bear d , "Who's Who in Nazidom," T e Nation
25 Mlrlam
138 (May 2, 1934):501.·
26 Ibid ., p. 502.
27 Ibid ., p. 503.
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for their honesty. Several other Nazi faithful were rewarded
guardianship of the "new Germanic soul." For example, the
German Labor Front Hinister, Dr. Ley was "a notorious rowdy
and drunkard, condemned once by regular courts for
assault."

28

Many Nazi leaders, mentioned by Th

Nation, had

been tried for crimes of violence and a few were implicated
in murders. This was not a group of highly respected
citizens leading the new state. These were men the world
could not respect and, thus, support. In short, "the Nazis
are friends neither to peace nor to organized
.,,29 The character of the Nazi leadership

society.

definitely betrayed what the National Socialist movement was
all about. If the followers of Hitler shared equally with
the FUhrer in responsibility, what of the German people
themselves? What were the attitudes of Th

Nation toward

them? Were the German people responsible and for what
reasons were they willing to accept Hitler?
Th

clearly believed the ready acceptance of

Hitler by the people of Germany revealed faults in their
national character. Hitler was successful because "the
Germans, always victims of an inferiority complex and always
stirred because the rest of the world will not accept them
at their own valuation as the greatest of all

28 Ibid .
29 Ibid ., p.504.
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nations.

. ,,30 H'It I er was well aware that these feelings

existed in the German people and they were "ready to believe
anyone who plays up to their national prejudices and tells
them what they wish to hear about their terrible
maltreatment.,,3l Hitler!s success with the Nazi movement was
undoubtedly due to something in the German subconscious.
Hitler was convinced that race decides the national
character of a people. Race does not determine national
character, according to T

-------

ion, but other factors do.

National history, environment, climate, upbringing,
institutions, and other causes are responsible for the
formation of national character.

32

Of course not everyone

shares in the same characteristics, but enough people must
for a national character to exist.
The N tion explained about the German national
characteristics that were their undoing in both 1914 and
1939. "In Germany an important factor has been the bad
influence of certain German philosophers, notably Hegel and
Fichte.,,33 The journal went on to single out the German

300swald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Hen: The Nazi
Child-Mind," p. 614.
3l Ibid .
32Robert Dell, "The Menace of a United Germany,"
Nation 149 (December 23, 1939):704.
33 Ibid .
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characteristics that got them into trouble in 1914 as well
as 1939.

Among the chief German national characteristics are an
inferiority complex, a craving for a FUhrer, and an
abnormal lack of common sense, which means a lack of
political sense.
• The unification of Germany in
1871 intensified the faults of the German character and
converted Germany into a huge machine which crushed
~h~t~ve: in§~pendence there was and destroyed individual
lnltlatlve.
A combination of German character flaws,

along with

the economic conditions in 1933 and the subsequent actions
of both France and England, brought the Nazi movement to
success in their bid for power. However, The Nation's
position was that none of what happened in Germany after
1933 would have been possible, regardless of other
circumstances, without the national characteristics of an
inferiority complex, a need for strong leadership, and an
inability, on the people's part, to see the political
consequences of their actions.
Hitler commanded an abject following. T e Nation
clearly thought little of Hitler as a person and as the
leader of Germany. It deplored his conduct and condemned his
views. Hitler's goals and aspirations, first to control
Germany and then Europe, destroyed all German freedoms. T
Xation held these freedoms to be essential for humanity.
With the destruction of German liberties, Hitler crushed the
soul and character of the German nation. Other Nazi leaders
34 Ibid .
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did not add to an acceptable picture of leadership in
Germany. The German people shared some responsibility, their
national character flaws allowed them to either accept or
support Hitler. The deplorable Nazi character disrupted
German life and the resultant consequences not only
devastated personal liberties but racial minorities and
dissident views as well.

CHAPTER III
NAZI ABUSES OF JEWS, GERMANS, AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF GERMAN CULTURE
The Nation was concerned with the abuses the German
people were suffering at the hands of the Nazis. From the
time the Nazis gained control of the German government in
1933, basic freedoms were outlawed. Hitler smashed all
opposition through either legal measures or violent
suppression. Anti-Jewish laws were instituted as well as
laws that affected most political groups. As a result, many
people lost the right to their livelihood. Aryans were not
allowed to buy in Jewish businesses and forms of repression
were used. A world boycott of German goods caused the Nazis
to try to cover up their persecution, but The Nation
continued its expose~ Many others, in addition to the
minorities, were persecuted by the Third Reich. The whole of
German culture was altered by the National Socialists.
Practitioners of the arts, educators, and scientists, were
either driven from Germany, subjected to repressive laws and
actions, or were humiliated by the new German order. In
addition, women also suffered under the Third Reich as their
earning power and status in German society were altered by
the Nazis! attitudes toward them.
31
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Once Hitler's foreign policy aspirations became
clear to The Nation,

its fears extended beyond Germany to

the other peoples of Europe. What happened to the oppressed
Germans could happen to others. Freedoms that Americans take
for granted and are, also,

the backbone of liberalism, were

outlawed by Hitler's regime. Free speech, freedom of the
press, equal employment opportunities, freedom from racial
and religious discrimination, and the right to vote were all
suppressed by the Nazis. Not only were freedoms eliminated,
but several groups of people were singled out by the Nazis
for persecution and "special treatment." Hitler believed he
had to destroy all opposition to insure his complete mastery
of Germany. In order to do this, Hitler eliminated all
political groups and persecuted other various people. But
Nazi action affected more than just the groups they believed
were their opponents; members of racial groups were chosen
for persecution and destruction in addition. The persecuted,
therefore,

included, "liberals, Socialists, Communists, Jews

or Catholics.
In 1933, persecution of the various people in
Germany took two basic forms:

legal repression and physical

abuse which sometimes went as far as death. Political groups
were outlawed by Nazi promulgation in 1933 and Jews were
denied equal status under the law. As early as 1933,
l"Nazis Against the \vorld," The Nation 136 (April 5,
1933):361.
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advocated a loosening of American immigration laws to
"facilitate the granting of visas •

. to permit the entry

of the German victims of political persecution.,,2 It has
been an American tradition to grant asylum to the persecuted
peoples of the world. This was to become a recurrent theme
for The Nation.
Persecution of the Jews began in 1933. The pogroms
exposed by the weekly were, however, only a foreshadowing of
what was to corne for the Jews in Germany and Europe under
Nazi rule. Jewish people suffered many losses under Nazi
subjugation. They were forced into ghettos and were the
worst treated in concentration camps. They lost their
property,

businesses, and livelihood. Also, Jews lost their

lives as Nazi suppression was extremely brutal. The Nation
believed the anti-Semitic policy,

pursued by the German

fascists, was a direct result of Hitler's personal hatreds.
Due to the persecution and pogroms of the Nazis,
many Jews, not yet aware that other countries would not
allow them to immigrate, would try to leave Germany. Escape,
however, became difficult for German Jews because in 1933
the Nazis instituted a sichtverrnerk or special visa which
was needed to leave the country and was required on all
passports. This special visa was Honly granted to

34
'Aryans' .,,3 As a consequence, many Jews were trapped inside
German borders and a dismal future awaited them.
The Nation recognized the Jews as being the most
severely persecuted under Nazi oppression. No American could
"imagine the pathological bloodthirstiness of the Nazi antiSemitic campaign.

. The moral tone and flavor of this

whole movement is grossly pathologica1.,,4 All human and
civil rights for the Jews were eradicated by Hitler.
Anathema to the liberal principles held by The Na

was

the elimination of basic human rights. This was the worst
kind of oppression to the journal. "No one, Jew, or non-Jel;l,
has any recourse in law against any aggression or any
cruelty, expropriation, imprisonment, or execution."S There
were many other forms of mistreatment devised by the Nazis.
The German fascists were going to deny all the civil rights
of their alleged enemies.
Not only were the Jews harassed out of their
professions, but by "law no municipal or federal employee
[was] allowed to buy in a Jewish store.,,6 All Jewish stores
were picketed and potential customers were hounded by the SA
3Letter, "Escaping the German Hell,"
(April 26, 1933):470.

Nation 136

4Ludwig Le\visohn, "Germany's Lowest Depths," The
Nat ion 136 01a y 3, 1933): 493.
5 Ibid .
6"The Nazi Hexxenkessel--A Letter," T
(September 6, 1933):269.
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and other uniformed Nazis. Another format available in the
Nazi arsenal of assault was the weekly paper,

the StUrmer.

The German weekly had a large circulation, and in every
large town it was posted publicly for any to read. The paper
claimed to be dedicated to the battle for truth, and it
"stresses every week in large roman type that 'Jews Are Our
Misfortune' .,,7 If an Aryan slipped up, forgot, and bought
from Jews, the StUrmer was sure to report it to the public.
"It is a shame when two hereditary peasants, Georg Heinrich
Sassmannshausen and Heinrich Dreisbach, both from
Birkenfield, do business with the notorious Talmud Jew and
Nazi hater, Simon from ErndtebrUck.,,8 This is an example of
the kind of article run by the weekly paper. The Nation
reported that Germans were named in this publication and
then were subject to persecution for patronizing Jewish
establishments. This was a highly effective tool of
repression.
Much of the extreme treatment of the Jews in the
first six months of the Nazi regime was given worldwide
publicity. As a result, world opinion created a boycott
against the Nazis which affected their pogroms in 1933. It
might appear, according to The

ation, as if persecution had

ended as a result of the boycott. But this was not so,
7Heinrich L. Schiller, "Prize Journalism Under
Hitler," The Nation 141 (July 3, 1935):12.
8 Ibid ., p.13.

36

insisted a reporter who made a trip to the hamlets,
villages, and areas that were less well-travelled by
tourists. He saw treatment contrary to Nazi claims.
"Everywhere I saw evidence of cruelty, violence, and
death.,,9 This reporter had many experiences with the terror
in Nazi Germany. One example should be sufficient to convey
the horror he felt. Two Jewish girls were taken by the
Nazis, stripped, beaten, raped, and left for dead in a
meadow. The families feared for these girls' lives because
they survived their torture and, as a consequence of their
families'

fear, were subsequently smuggled into Switzerland.

This kind of savagery and even worse was rampant in Germany.
Physical abuse, as well as other kinds of harassment, took a
toll. "Socially and economically, as well as politically,
the Jews have been ruined. Those who have not suffered
physical violence are experiencing mental torture almost as
severe. ,,10 The Nation was one of the fe\'l publications in the
U.S. that printed the truth about the persistent Nazi
hostility and brutality toward the Jews.

~ost

of the

American press relied upon German sources for information
regarding the treatment of the Jews in Germany and
elsewhere. II The weekly printed a letter from a German woman
9Richard Neuberger, "The New Germany," p. 377.
IOIbid., p. 378.
11

Sara Alpern, Freda Kirchwey: A Woman of The
Nation, p. 114.
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who complained of the "gullibility" of Americans in their
acceptance of Nazi lies as the truth.

12

In 1936, the Nazis began one of the greatest antiJewish drives, "probably the last and greatest of them
all.,,13 This was only a foretaste of what was to come,
according to Th

Nation. Ghettos were established in Germany

by the promulgation of the Nilrnberg Laws on the fourteenth
of September. These laws took away the final vestiges of
Jewish economic independence. Many people, including some
Jews, believed the creation of the Ghettos would bring
respite for the Jewish people. Even though they would be
denied their freedom of movement, it was assumed that they
would, at least, be free from anxiety and have some
assurance of their future. Such beliefs were ludicrous in
the face of previous evidence and were doomed to disappoint
those who looked optimistically upon the NUrnberg Laws. The
believed the Jews and others were grasping at
straws.

14

This law only legalized the current state of

pogroms, boycotts, and other harsh treatment that existed in
Germany prior to 1936.

269.

12"The Nazi Hexxenkessel--A Personal Letter," p.

13\.Jilliam Zuckerman, "Where the German Ghetto
Leads," The Nati n 142 (February 5, 1936):155.
14 Ibid ., pp. 154-55.
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As part of the The Nation's compilation of inhuman
treatment, in 1936, also, came the revelation that Jews were
the worst treated prisoners in the Nazi concentration camps.
A prisoner, who survived the ordeal,

told of the different

groups confined in the camps. Criminals, Austrians,
political prisoners, critics, and religious fanatics were
included in the groups imprisoned by the Nazis. Among these
various people the Jews were "the worst-treated prisoners.
All occupations in the workshops [were] forbidden
them.

.,dS The Jews had to perform all the hard, dirty

work. The graves in the cemetery proved how hard it was for
the Jews. The Jewish people, in other nations, were not
going to be any safer from the ravages of Nazism than they
were in Germany.
The fate of the Austrian Jews was, virtually, the
same as that of the Jews in Germany. Only five months after
the German Anschluss with Austria, 20,000 Jews were either
arrested or placed in concentration camps. Jewish property
and savings were confiscated and the people theMselves were
subject to "the grossest physical indignities.,,16 The "cold
pogroms" \.ere, basically, economic and their aim was to
drive the Jewish businessmen from the Reich. No one was

lSJohann Schmidt, "Sojourn in Hell," The Nation 143
(September 12, 1936):301.
16William E. Dodd, "Germany Shocked Me," The
147 (August 20, 1938):176.

n
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allowed to buy from Jewish merchants, and if anyone did,
they were, in turn,
The

~ation

persecuted as in Germany.
feared the confiscation and closure of

Jewish businesses in Germany threatened the Jews in a vital
area. Other than the physical abuse, certainly, the gravest
consequence for the Jews was their exclusion from earning a
wage. In 1937, the weekly lamented that 75 per cent of all
Jews who held positions in 1933 had been dismissed. The
remaining 25 per cent were chiefly employed by other Jews.

17

Not only were Jewish people denied employment, but education
was denied to them, also. Jews could not join the army or go
to labor camp. In 1937, there were still 375,000 Jews in
Germany. Of this number, 100,000 were dependent for their
support upon Jewish charitable agencies and another 100,000
were supported by their relatives. It was also reported by
The Nation that every Jewish family that still had income
supported three other Jewish families.
The Nation was concerned with what had happened to
225,000 Jews as in 1933, there had been approximately
600,000 Jews in Germany, and the number dwindled to 375,000
during the next four years. It was estimated that 125,000
left the country either before the restrictions or secretly
escaped from Germany, The rest of the Jews were dead
(100,000). Many were either killed by the Nazis or died from

The

17philip S, Bernstein, "The Fate of German Jews,"
145 (October 23, 1937):423.
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causes attributable to the German fascists. No one living
under these circumstances would want to have children; as a
result, the death rate greatly outpaced the birth rate among
the Jews. The Nation,

therefore, concluded that "the Nazi

assault upon the German Jews moves on from segregation to
pauperization, to emigration [if possible], to
annihilation.,,18 In fact,

the only choice left for the Jews

was either emigration or death. This was a very chilling
forecast of the future.
In the face of these horrors, The Nation asked where
this state wide anti Semitic policy originated and what were
the causes? The weekly believed it had an answer. "It all
stems from Hitler and from the philosophy explicitly stated
in his book 'Mein Kampf'. ,,19 The Nazis believed the Jewish
people were the reason or explanation for a prostrate and
humiliated post-war Germany. How else could the Aryan race
have failed to win the war? If Hitler has his way, "by 1950
no Jew will be living within the boundaries of Germany, that
they all will have been killed or driven into exile.,,20
Although The Nation knew anti-Semitism was prevalent
throughout Germany and the rest of Europe, only the Nazis

18 Ibid ., p. 425.
19iHlliam E. Dodd, "Germany Shocked He," p. 178.
20 Ibid .
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and their extreme hostilities could have fostered the
fanatical policies of the Third Reich.
The Nation kept up a persistent appeal for worldwide
aid for the Jews. Their alternative was extremely bleak if
no aid was forthcoming.

"The house of the Jews in Central

Europe is aflame, and arson is the deliberate policy of
fascism. ,,21 Host nations, however, refused to open up their
immigration policies to enable the refugees of Europe to
have a place of safety. This refusal of help was followed by
The Nation's condemnation, which included the United States.
Americans did little to change Roosevelt's policy of not
increasing the American quota. The weekly, in no uncertain
terms, blar.Jed the Ar.Jerican people. "Behind this [the lack of
change] lies the distressing apathy of the American people
as a whole to the plight of the refugees.

,,22 The

weekly asserted every means should be explored for getting
the victims of Nazi persecutions saved from certain death.
This was not just a Jewish problem or a European one.
Because the people of the United States were part of a
worldwide community, Americans had to fight against this
kind of Nazi oppression and deal with the resultant anguish.
In particular, Americans must care about basic rights being
subverted by the Nazis. "It is the fight of everyone who
21"Death Trap for Jews," The Nation 147 (July 16,
1938):61.
22 Ibid .
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believes in personal liberty and civil rights, a fight for
the principles on which America was founded.,,23 There was a
general consensus, at the journal, that this was the duty of
Americans.
The Nation, frustrated by the lack of caring and
response and because it was concerned for the Jews in
Europe, continued its plea for help. The petition for
assistance from other countries was again repeated as the
savage attacks on Jews had not abated. For example, the
anniversary of the Armistice in Germany in 1938 was
celebrated by the Nazi youths' destruction of Jewish
property. Their homes, shops, and synagogues were plundered
and burned. Thousands of Jews were beaten and arrested while
police and firemen looked on. "Never were mass cowardice,
mass brutality, and mass destruction so gruesomely
displayed.,,24 The governments of the world must develop a
refugee program to rescue the displaced of Europe. No longer
could Americans deny their duty and heritage. This was an
appeal for a "revival of the spirit that made the right of
asylum a genuine part of our legacy of democratic
ideas.

,,25 The fascists had thrown a gauntlet at the

23Richard Neuberger, "The New Germany," p. 379.
24Editorial, "\tlar Against the Jews," The Nation 147
(November 19, 1938):524.
25Freda Kirchwey, "Jews and Refugees," (Editorial)
Nation 148 (May 20, 1937):577.
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feet of the American people according to The

.;;.;...;;;-"-......;;;..;;.;;.

• "If we

refuse to pick it up or pretend we don't see it, we shall

have agreed in advance to the annihilation of every decent
and humane value in life and have given Hitler his greatest
bloodless victory.,,26 The weekly supported the liberal
belief that every non-fascist nation was, in some way,
responsible for the fate of the European refugees. These
countries had a responsibility to perform. The United
States, in the forefront of the democracies, had a special
duty which was held in common with the American heritage for
providing asylum from any form of persecution. Not only did
Nazi persecution affect the minorities, but every part of
German culture was also touched by the new order. Oppression
took a peculiar, but effective, form in Nazi Germany. All
groups guilty of mental, economic, or political heresy were
denied the basic right to livelihood. The government
impounded savings, positions were denied to the oppressed,
and those "who have not accepted the Nazi political and
economic religion are doomed to starvation.,,27
Americans should not only be concerned about the
Jewish people, but as additional areas of German life came
under Nazi attack, their concern must be for others, also.
The free trade unions were suppressed in 1933, and many
26 Ibid .
27Editorial, "Back to Barbarism," The Nation 136
(April 12, 1933):388.
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workers,

including union leaders, were thrown into

concentration camps. In areas allover Germany, another
reporter met men who were lucky to outlive the camps as most
did not. Many survivors were either deaf and or gruesomely
"
" d b y the
mang 1 e d f rom varlOUS
tortures d eVlse
Instead of their free trade unions,
compelled to join the

hl
l~

azl" S.28

the workers were
Membership was

mandatory in the Nazi worker's union and so was attendance
at meetings. This was another method used by the Nazis to
control and subjugate the German people, especially those
whom were highly suspect, and the workers certainly were.
Workers were under suspicion because, in general,

they had

been members of the labor parties and the Social Democratic
Party, and as a consequence, the Nazis believed they
warranted serveillance. Many Germans had not originally
supported Hitler; therefore, many people were suspected by
the Nazis.
Regardless of what the National Socialists reported,
they certainly were aware that they did not have the
complete support of the German people. The Nazis knew, for
their dominance to be complete, all German citizens had to
be under some form of Nazi authority. Almost all Germans
were forced into Nazi controlled organizations.

~ith

workers

it was the Arbeitsfr nt and with German young people the
28Evelyn Lawrence, "The Hitler Terror Mounts," The
Nation 139 (September 5, 1934):261.
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form of manipulation and molding was, primarily, the Hitler
Youth. The Nazis needed to master a whole nation and to do
so Hitler had to subvert German law. For the Nazis to gain
complete mastery of Germany, they altered German criminal
law and the courts. The Penal Code Amendment Law went into
effect on September I, 1935 and The Nation believed the law
would have far reaching impact. "The law codifies Nazi lynch
justice, divorces jurisprudence from impartiality and makes
the National Socialist Weltanschauung [creed or philosophy
of life] the guiding star of criminal trials.,,29 The
revolution in German law was to be accomplished by requiring
the judges' subservience to Nazi ideology. They were to
respond to Nazi wishes. If the jurists did not do so, then
they would be called to order by the State Attorney who was,
obviously, a National Socialist.
No law had to be disobeyed for a crime to have been
committed, only Nazi Weltanschauung need be violated. The
new Nazi statute called for conviction and punishment to be
based on "sound public sentiment." In other words, "'[iJf no
definite criminal law applies to the deed, it must be
punished in accordance with the law the basic ideas of which
best fit it' .,,30 According to The Nation, this new law put
the complete control of German citizens into Nazi hands. If
29 Emil Lengyel, "Germany Codifies Lynch Law," The
Nation 141 (September 4, 1935):263.
30 Ibid .
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Germans did not conform to Xazi ideology, they were tried as
criminals, convicted,

thrown into jailor executed. The

journal believed Nazi law cast a pall over German
jurisprudence. "[U]nder the new [law] he may be found guilty
even if he has broken no law fitting the case. The new law,
in short, gives the Nazi state the legal means to crush
political opposition of every imaginable kind.,,31 And not
just political opposition, but Jewish and "Aryan" marriages,
for example, were outlawed by the application of
Weltanschauung. This was the kind of tyranny the Nazi law
led to. Furthermore, the Nazi's ideology was to have even
more far-reaching affect on the Jews.
In the process of dominating Germany and changing
the laws to reflect Xazi ideology, the best of the Republic
was to be replaced by a Germanic culture which would unite
"racial intolerance with a blind and aggressive nationalism
[and] all achievement, all leadership, all organization are
to be according to the racial reinterpretation of history,
artei

.,,32 Hitler's reinterpretation of

German society would affect Germany in many painful and
disruptive ways. Oppression, one of the tools used by the
Nazis to restructure all of German society, was not solely
physical in nature according to The Nation. It could include
31 Ibid •
32Ludwig Lore, "The Nazi Revolution at \vork," p. 442
and Ludwig Lewisohn, "The New Kultur," p. 695,
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emotional trauma as well as physical violence. Germans saw
their scientists, writers, educators, and other

intellectuals either interred or forced to flee into exile
from Germany. Education, theatre,

film, written materials,

all marks of culture, were altered by contact with Hitler
and the Nazis. Women, and their roles in society, were
redefined in connection with Nazi constraints. The freedom
to participate in German culture, as it was before the Nazis
came to power, was an essential liberty which was denied by
the Nazis according to The Nation.
Two months after Hitler came to power in 1933, the
"government has swept like a devastating storm over creative
••
Germany. ,,33 .A. troc~t~es
were

•

comm~tte

d
'
.
aga~nst
persons ~n

every creative field. Practitioners of the arts, letters,
sciences, and all cultural fields had not escaped the Nazi
wrath.

h

Nation understood that these acts by the Nazis

were not uncontrolled passions released by their revolution.
"They are part of a definite, carefully planned program of
relentless persecution against those who refuse to accept
the National Socialist super national philosophy, or who,
because of race or creed, have incurred the hatred of the
present rulers.,,34 Hore than a hundred actors were excluded
from the stage in Germany. All managers and directors of
33Ludwig Lore, "The Nazi Revolution at Hork," p.
442.

34 Ibid .

48
theatres and opera houses were replaced by Nazis of dubious
talent. Liberal and radical writers were driven from
Germany. Among their ranks were writers such as, Thomas Mann
and Heinreich Mann. Modern architects, city physicians, and
editors of magazines and newspapers were asked to resign or
were arrested by the Nazis. The National Socialists
rejected, as false, all aspects of German intellectual
culture achieved by the Second Reich and the Weimar
Republic. The Nazis discarded all parts of the Weimar
culture, which The _N.. :;.;. ;;.. .;;;;.. ::.. .=n described as "the true torch
bearers of civilization in Germany.

• ,,35 Instead, the

Nazis retained and exalted "the worst aspects of Prussianism
and Kaiserism.

,,36

Many Germans were displaced, arrested,

left without

work, or were forced into exile because of the Nazi
revolution which began in 1933. The areas of German life
affected and the list of professions altered by the Nazis
are too numerous to include in their entirety in this paper.
Therefore, one area of German intellectual life will be
examined, in more detail, to reveal the extent of the
devastation portrayed by Th

Nation in its pages. The

universities were hard hit by the Nazi intent to restructure
German culture. The theoretical basis of Nazi culture was
35 Emil Lengyel, "German Culture in Exile,"
Nation 136 (May 31, 1933):607.
36 Ibid .
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found in Ernst Krick's book: The N tional Socialist
Education. Krick's book rapidly became the Bible of Nazi
teachers. An example of Nazi theory: "'The Age of pure
reason and of unprejudiced free science is over'.
The

bemoaned the fact that Krick was the foundation

of Nazi education. No longer would free thinking be allowed
by the Nazis. Only National Socialist dogma was acceptable
as the source of subject material in the schools of the
Third Reich. Teachers had to submit to the Nazis. "The Third
Reich glories in the suppression of individuality, and the
ideal of the community must be the 'volkisches Mensch,'

the

'race man' bare of personal traits, subordinating his
knowledge and will to the Fatherland.,,38 Obviously some
professors would have difficulty subordinating their
"knowledge and will to the Fatherland." By May 1933, 250
professors were known to have been dismissed from their
posts in German universities. According to The N t

n, the

reasons for dismissal were shaped by the Nazi desire to
purge the universities of undesirables. Of the number
deprived of their appointments, 40 per cent were known to be
Jewish and the rest were liberals and pacifists. Many more
professors, though the numbers were uncertain,

resigned

their positions in protest to Nazi action. Nazi student

37 Ibid .
38 Ibid .

so
corporations issued "certificates of confidence" to
professors whose political beliefs they supported. Nazi
students also boycotted those lectures of professors known
to possess political beliefs contrary to Nazi dogma. In
Prussia alone, more than thirty non-Aryan and Marxist
·
.
d b ecause
pro f essors were d lsmlsse

0

f

.
.
.
39
stu d ent lnstlgatlon.

Nazi student agitation did not effect only male professors.
Female professors were devastated by the German fascists.
The most thorough cleansing process in German
universities, was with the dismissal of women professors;
they were all purged from their positions. The Nation was
concerned because of all the women in Germany, other than
Jewish women, the hardest hit by the hatred of the Weimar
culture were women intellectuals. These women not only had
their livelihood snatched from them, but also, their whole
lives invalidated, "for in The Third Reich there is no place
for intellect and, outside of the kitchen no place for
women."

40

Examples of women's treatment in the first two

Reichs greatly influenced official Nazi policy for The Third
Reich. Women in Barbarossa's First Reich were little more
than chattel. From the Second Reich came the official Nazi
policy toward women. Their policy is probably best defined

39 Ibid .• pp. 607-08.
40 Ibid ., p. 608.
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by Wilhelm II's own words: "'Kirche, Klichen, Kinder' .,,41
This belief, although it found expression in the Second

Reich. was not the official policy. Beyond the realm of this
womanly domain--the church, kitchen, and children--women in
Nazi Germany were not expected to contribute to their
country in any other form whatsoever. A prime example of how
this anti-women Nazi dogma affected women professors was
given by T e Nation. German sociologist, Mathilde Vaerting
was a prominent faculty member at a prestigious German
university. In particular, the Nazis renounced her research
which set out to prove that men's dominance of women was
based on sociological rather than biological factors.
Vaerting's intellect was not considered worthy of the state.
Her continued presence at a university belied the Nazi
doctrine that all women should contribute to the state by
remaining at home and bearing children. Professor Vaerting
was fired. "Her dismissal is the most striking overt act so
far committed in the Nazi war against the freedom of
women.,,42
These stringent restrictions did not apply equally,
across the board, to women. The intentions of the Nazis were
there, but it did not work out that way for them. By a law
passed on June 1, 1933, Hitler intended to relieve

4l Ibid •
·
. I , The Nation 137 (August 16, 1933):171.
42 Ed ltorla
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unemployment by eliminating women workers. Was Hitler's
policy successful and did the women benefit from the
consequences? To begin with, women workers were not
eliminated from holding jobs. In 1936, there were 5,470,000
women employed in Germany. There were 1,200,000 more women
working in 1937 than in 1932, before Hitler. Women accounted
for 31 per cent of the German labor force. More women were
working in Germany than in either England or France. 43
Even with women working in increasing numbers, were
women workers secure in their positions and had Nazi
directives benefited them? These questions were of real
concern to The Nati

. It answered no to both of these

inquiries. liThe vigorous campaign against the employment of
women has not led to their increased domesticity and
security, but has been effective in squeezing them out of
the better-paid positions into the sweated trades.,,44 Not
only were women forced into the sweated trades for lower
wages, but women workers, in general, lost real income from
1933 to 1937. This, also, happened to employed men, but
women lost more in comparison.

(See Chapter IV for the

details on what happened to male workers.) In 1937, the
average male worker earned a net of $11 to $12 per week. The
average weekly wage for a female worker was $6 to $8. For
43Judith Gruenfeld, "Women Workers in Nazi Germany,1I
The Nation 144 (March 13, 1937):295.
44 Ibid •
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example, in the typographical trades, hourly earnings of
women employees was 48.4 per cent lower than the rates for

men. A comparison of these statistics to those of 1931 or
1932 reveals women's average income had dropped more than
the men's income.

45

Because women were paid much less than

men, it was easier for them to find employment and the
process of lowering their rates was continued.
So much for women being eliminated from their
employment by the Nazis' policy and law. In fact, Germany
was dependent upon the labor of women workers because there
was a shortage of male workers in Germany. Of the total 17.6
million German workers, 13.7 million were male workers. Even
if every available male worker was employed, there would
have been a shortage of 4.4 million workers. Women workers
were, consequently, essential to German production of export
commodities and the rearmament industry.
Did women benefit from their necessity in labor? Not
according to The Nation. They generally worked in more
dangerous and demeaning positions with longer, exhausting
hours. Women, also, made less money than they did prior to
Hitler. German women were worse off than were women in other
parts of Europe. "Cultural progress tends to eliminate hard
work for women and to facilitate their ascent to higher

45 Ibid .
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professions. Fascism reverses this process.,,46 Although
women intellectuals lost the most, their professions as well
as their sense of worth, in fascist Germany, women of lower
classes were affected in far greater numbers by the
stringent Nazi policies and attitudes toward women in the
work place. Women not only lost their sense of worth,

by

being told they were inferior and that they could not make
worthwhile contributions, they also lost their ability to
provide for their families adequately as wages dropped.
Instead, they were told by the Reich that they could remain
at home and produce children for Germany.
The

recognized that all segments of German

culture were affected by Nazi persecutions and their
reorganization of the state. Many groups, as a result, were
traumatized and destroyed by contact with Hitler's regime.
The Nazis wanted to restructure German and European
societies in the National Socialist image. This Nazi picture
included the annihilation of the Jews, communists, and
social democrats. Nazi reaction extended to anyone who
opposed them or represented the Weimar culture. Persecution
did not always take legal form, and whether it was or not
did not matter to the Nazis. The Nation knew the end result,
complete Nazi dominance was the primary goal. The Nazis
considered their acts of terror,

46 Ibid ., p. 296.

physical violence, and
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murder to be expedient methods which enabled them to reach
their goals.

CHAPTER IV
ATTITUDES TOWARD NAZI ECONOMIC POLICY
AND ITS EFFECTS
A central issue of Nazi policy, crucial to The
Nation,

was Germany's economic position and intended

recovery.

It saw the consequences of Nazi economic policies

as a barometer of the Third Reich's success. The weekly,
from the beginning of the Nazi regime in 1933,

believed

Hitler would be unsuccessful in his attempts to turn the
German economy around.

Even though Hitler attained success

by 1936 with full employment due to the armament boom,
N

The

i n ' s primary concern was whether this general prosperity

really benefited the workers of Germany. The journal was
also concerned with what Hitler's rearmament resolutions
would lead the Nazis to attempt because of inadequate raw
materials available in Germany.
In the early period under Nazi rule,
according to The

ion,

~~---

recovery attempts.

the Germans,

were not successful in their

In 1933, Hitler wanted a moratorium on

the interests of the debts settled on Germany by the terms
of the Versailles Treaty. The general shrinking of both
exports and imports for Germany indicated a worsening of its
economic position, according to The N

56

n. The Reich's
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recovery program was based on increased output and a
reduction of wages to meet its obligations. The periodical
editorialized that this was an unsound principle because it
destroyed the buying power of the German people which would
lead to a collapse of the internal market.

1

The Na i n ' s

prediction was accurate as the German domestic market did
collapse. Every government effort made since the internal
collapse led the nation's industries and financial
institutions even deeper into the morass.
matters have gone from bad to worse."

2

"Under Hitler

Hitler put into

effect high tariffs on food stuffs and in so doing set off
another inflationary spiral with staple prices rising
anywhere from 10-50 per cent.
editorial concluded with,

In a

jab at the Nazis,

the

H[iJt proves the futility of the

Chancellor's visionary projects for social and economic
reconstruction on a gigantic scale. It also shows why Herr
Hitler so assiduously emphasizes his peaceful intentions.,,3
Hitler had certainly not been able to manipulate the
economic situation in Germany during the early years of Nazi
control.
The Nation expressed considerable concern for the
worker in Nazi Germany. Hitler was not able to achieve the

lEditorial, The Nation 136 (June 7,
2 Ibid .
3 Ibid .

1933):658.
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economic changes needed to benefit the worker. There was
also, some doubt at the weekly whether Hitler would want to
benefit the worker if he was able to do so. As a
consequence, The Nation asserted, the worker would gain the
least and suffer the most (with the exception of the Jews)
under Hitler's rule. The journal reported that the standard
of living was steadily falling although employment had
risen. There were 2,800,000 unemployed as compared with
double that number when Hitler took office. The Nation,
however, claimed that the figures for unemployment were
juggled. But no evidence was offered to substantiate this
claim. Improvement in unemployment could not be attributed
solely to Nazi policy, according to the periodical.
Reduction of unemployment was based largely on a worldwide
increase in trade and economic conditions.
Even though the standard of living had fallen and
many workers were no better off or in worse economic
positions than they were in 1933,

lamented the

working class, in general, still supported Hitler. In part,
this was due to the fall in unemployment; however, the
weekly believed there was another reason for continued
support of Hi tIer. "Like everybody else, they [the workers]
are still being drugged by the almost overwhelming
government propaganda, by Hitler's eloquence.

• they have

not yet taken in the significance of Hitler's admission on
April 17 that National Socialism can not abolish

59
unemployment."

4

By August 1935,

cent in four months,

living costs had risen 6 per

while average wages of unskilled

workers dropped 18 per cent.

Skilled labor,

in comparison,

lost 8.5 per cent in wages during the same period. 5
The Nation was convinced,

by 1935,

Socialists were in trouble in Germany.

the National

Nazi policies were

not successful in staving off the economic failures that the
journal was sure had to come. There was little support of
Hitler's economic policies as many German people lamented
there had been little improvement in two years.

There was

growing unrest among small business men whom both the public
and the government had accused of profiteering.

Housewives

resorted to consumer strikes and there were reports of wage
movements in the industrial sections of Germany.

"There are

unmistakable signs of disintegration in the National
Socialist regime.

[T]here is hardly a group or class

in the nation that is satisfied with the present state of
affairs.,,6
The Nazis,
prediction.

however,

By 1938,

full

cheated The Nation out of its

employment in Germany was achieved

because of the armament boom which had begun in 1935 and
resulted in a turn around of German attitudes toward Hitler

4Editorial, The Nation 139 (Nay 23,
5Editorial, The Nation 141
6 Ibid . ,

P . 146.

1934):579.

(August 7,

1935):145.
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and the Nazis. Even with this apparent victory, the weekly
believed the Nazis did not achieve true prosperity for the
German workers. Wages in 1938 stood at 1933 levels, reported
The Nation. The average wage for skilled labor in 1929 was
101.1 pfennigs per hour compared to 79 pfennigs in December
of 1938. Already lowered wages were reduced further by heavy
taxation,

voluntary contributions, social-insurance

contributions, and so forth. The size of these deductions
can be inferred from the fact that taxes and donations
totaled 47.1 per cent of the entire national income. 7 The
cost of living had also increased. If cost of living was
estimated conservatively at a 10-15 per cent increase since
1933, real wages, were, thus, considerably smaller than in
1933. The five million unemployed of 1933 were better off in
1938-39, whereas "the thirteen million who had jobs when
Hitler came to power have suffered a substantial loss in
real income and had no share in the apparent prosperity.,,8
Therefore, The Nation believed that even though Germany
enjoyed full employment, prosperity did not benefit everyone
in the Third Reich. As a group, most workers were less well
off than they were before Hitler's regime began in 1933.
The German worker had lost real income and was not
truly benefited by full employment. The Nation felt the
7Adolf Strumthal, "The End of Hitler's Money
Hiracles," The Nation 148 (April 22, 1939):461.
8 Ibid .
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workers lost, additionally, because of the disabilities they
suffered under the Third Reich's full employment policies.
The weekly was convinced that overwork and undernourishment
resulted in many millions of lost hours of labor due to
illness and disability. Thirty-one workers per hundred, in
1932, were on illness disability compared to 46 per hundred
in 1938. 9 In January 1939, disability rates were 31.5 per
cent greater than in December 1938. Most workers faced a
work day in excess of eight hours, often working ten hours a
day, and in some cases, fourteen hours a day in a work week
of six days. The Nazis reacted with severe penalties for the
many workers who slowed down or stayed away from work. Dr.
Robert Ley, the head of the Labor Front, "put it bluntly,
'Socialism in the Third Reich is a hard manly socialism; not
the well-being of the individual but that of the community
matters' .,,10 The Nation was not in agreement with this
assessment. The workers were needed for the state's
armaments efforts. "His [Hitler's] labor policy is designed
to get more work out of men who have less to eat. But even a
dictator cannot override physical laws.,,11 What were the
benefits for the worker under the Reich's full employment?
The weekly concluded, "[tJhus 'full employment' in Hitler's
9Judith Gruenfeld, ",.,Thy Hitler Must Bluff," The
149 (July 8, 1939):36.
10 Ibid ., p. 37.
11 Ibid ., p. 36.
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Reich is not identical with workers' well-being but actually
entails their own complete exhaustion.,,12 Health and
disability issues coupled with the lack of improvement in
real wages for the workers in Germany, led

Nation to

down play any success claimed by the Nazis. The journal
believed true success must also include improvement for all
the workers and their working conditions.
Because full employment and Germany's economic
independence were essential for the armament program, the
country was put on the Four Year Plan in 1936. This placed
Germany on a war time economy and the entire German economy
was mobilized in the process. Again, German workers
suffered, this time, because of shortages. The Nation held
"the unappeased appetite of the war industries has created a
crisis in non-armament plants.,,13 Raw materials went first
to war industries with the result that all goods were in
short supply; there was little left over for civilian
consumption. Secondly, one of the Four-

ar Plan's principal

reasons for existence was to alter the food habits of the
nation.

Inadequate supplies of staple products (fats, meats,

dairy products, fruits,

vegetables, and grains) in

combination with other shortages, have "made the German the

l2 Ibid ., pp. 36-37.
13 L • F. Gittler, "No Food for \-Jar," The Nation 149
(July 8, 1939):39.
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worst-fed and worst-clothed person in Europe.,,14 Doctors
reported more cases of nutritional diseases during 1938 than
in all ten years prior to Hitler's regime.
The Nation wanted to know how the Nazis combated the
grumbling and discontent of the afflicted Germans. The
weekly found the Nazis used propaganda, one of their
favorite approaches for any problem. First, Nazi propaganda
showed that Germans were not so badly off. Pictures of
Americans,

taken in the depths of the depression, showed

there were worse conditions than in Germany. Second,
Germany's poverty could be blamed on unfair treaties and
reparations. Third, world Jewry cornered the international
market in food stuffs and refused to sell them to the Reich.
Fourth,

luxury foods,

such as white bread, were termed by

Nazis as decadent indulgences that could be replaced with
more wholesome foods.

The Nation maintained that propaganda

could not alter the facts;

shortages existed and as a

consequence workers were not prospering in the Third Reich.
The second purpose of the Plan was to foster German
economic independence. The Four-Year Plan "is to insure the
Reich against economic coercion,

particularly in time of

war."lS Considerable efforts were made to make Germany
independent. For example, research was done on artificial
14 Ibid .,

p. 38.

1S John C. DevHlde, "Dr. Schacht and Germany's
Future," The Nation 145 (October 16, 1937):402.
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products to produce the goods and foodstuffs that Geroany

needed. However, one of the negative aspects of the FourYear Plan, at least for business men and Dr. Schacht,
Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, was
the acceleration of the trend toward government control over
German business. By 1938 the Nazis controlled all foreign
trade, rationed and stipulated uses of raw materials, fixed
wages and prices, destroyed trade unions and as a result
were in control of labor, invested capital where they saw
fit, and used profits where prescribed by Nazi needs. 16
Certainly The Nation believed that economic progress in Nazi
Germany primarily benefited the state, as represented by
Hitler, and what was good for the state did not correspond
to what was good for the citizens.
On the other hand, there was every indication that
Germany had made great economic strides. Just gearing up for
the armament process was an industrial success in the face
of overwhelming odds, but Th

Nation asked who benefited

from these apparent accomplishments and how had the Reich
been able to finance its rearmament? The Nazis accomplished
their goals primarily through two finance measures. The
first of these was direct borrowing. In January of 1938, the
officially admitted debt stood at 18,600 million Reichmarks,
which was twice the debt of 1933. Second, Germany used

16 Ibid ., p. 403.
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taxation of its citizens as another avenue for obtaining
finances. Germans in 1938 were some of the most highly taxed
persons in Europe. Taxes in 1938 were double the amount of
1933, and the rise of income had not kept pace with this
level in taxation.

17

Nevertheless, even with the sharp rise

in production and stable consumption figures,

thanks to the

Four-Year Plan, it was clear "that all gain has been devoted
to armaments and state needs and has afforded little benefit
to the individual." l8
The Nation understood that the Nazi monetary
requirements for their rearmament plans involved their need
to buy raw materials or somehow gain control of the regions
that produced their vital materials. Nazi Germany required
more raw resources than it had available to supply its
armament program. The coming war would be even more
dependent upon machines than the last one. 19 The next war,
feared by most Europeans and Americans, would be won by
those countries which could continue to produce war
machinery while the war raged on. 20 Certain fundamentals for

l7 A. Vidakovic, "How Sound Is German Economy?," The
Nation 146 (April 16, 1938) :437.
l8 Ibid ., p. 438.
19Fritz Sternberg, "Time Is \.,[ith the Allies," The
Nation 149 (October 14, 1939):407.
20Maxwell S. Stewart, "Can Europe Afford War?," The
143 (September 19, 1936):324-26; Fritz Sternberg,
.;.;.::-=-::....:::....:.:.-s \.Jith the Allies," p. 407.
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an effective war industry were an established iron and steel
industry, as well as established machine and chemical
production. And, of course, assured supplies of coal, iron
ore, and oil were essential to their armament production.
Germany was not supplied with most of these vital raw
materials. Coal being the only resource Germany adequately
produced, the Reich had to trade for oil, iron are, and
chemicals. The Treaty of Versailles had taken away most of
the regions that had supplied Germany's iron ore (75 per
cent) and chemical needs. Germany had never had any oil of
.
1ts
own. 21 F or examp 1 e, five-sixths of the Germans iron ore
requirements came from other countries. In 1937, Germany
produced 9.6 million tons of iron ore and imported 20.6
million tons. In addition, German ore was not as rich in
iron as the imported sources. The Reich's war potential was,
therefore, extremely dependent upon foreign sources. 22 These
raw materials, vital to Germany, were available to the east
and the west. Rumania was rich in oil, Yugoslavia had many
fine chemical deposits, and both Czechoslovakia and the
·
. h"1n 1ron ore. 2 3 Th
area a f F rance were r1C
Lorra1ne

Nation

believed that the Reich's need for raw materials was one of

325.

21 r1ax \<lell S. Stewart, "Can Europe Afford \..Jar?," p.

22Joachim Joesten, "Germany vs. Russia in the
North," The Nation 148 (June 24, 1939):719.
325.

23Maxwell S. Stewart, "Can Europe Afford \var?," p.
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the reasons that it retook the Rhineland in 1936. The rich
deposits and available resources in the countries and
regions surrounding Germany were essential to the Reich's
future war efforts.

Nation believed this to be true as

early as 1936, its evidence was the retaking of the
Rhineland. Industrial materials were so vital that "they
might easily swing the balance in the next war.

. If by

reason of deficiency or foreign exchanges or sanctions these
supplies were withheld, it is highly probable that they
would be seized.,,24 A highly astute assessment, by the
weekly, of future events and German motivation. The Na ion
reasoned that Germany saw the development of their war
industry as crucial for the Reich's survival in a future
war. Weaponry was not only crucial for survival,

but was

needed by Hitler to fulfill his other planned foreign policy
aspirations.
Although the Nazis got off to a rocky start in 1933,
they were able to turn the German economy around by starting
the rearmament process in 1934. T

Nation, however,

supported the supposition that full employment did not
necessarily, benefit everyone in Germany. In particular, the
journal was concerned for the workers and for good reason as
its evidence shows. The

24 Ibid ., p. 326.

i n, also, linked the Nazi

~~~=
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rearmament industry and the necessity for raw resources with
the Nazi aspirations for territorial expansion.

CHAPTER V
HITLER'S FOREIGN POLICY ASPIRATIONS AND
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN RESPONSE
The Nation reacted to Hitler's foreign policy in two
ways. First, the weekly analyzed what Hitler's goals were
and how he intended to accomplish them. Hitler wanted to
pursue an aggressive foreign policy. To justify his actions
and methods with Germans and the rest of Europe, Hitler
relied upon German history, Germany's economic needs, and
the creation of pan-Germanism. The techniques the Nazis
utilized were not subtle at all. They used agents who
infiltrated other countries with the intention of
overthrowing the governments of the coveted nations. In
addition to this propaganda program, Hitler appealed to the
duty and loyalty of Germans living in other countries.
Hitler began his plan for the creation of a pan

ermanic

empire by breaking Versailles and achieving

with

Austria. Next Czechoslovakia was seized and, finally,

Poland

was captured.
Second, the weekly was concerned with the reactions
Hitler's policies would bring. It knew war was probably
inevitable if Hitler was allowed to continue with his plans
unchecked. The

believed Americans had to adopt
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policies that would keep them out of any European conflict.
Collective security was the method of keeping the U.S. out
of war that was advocated by the journal. The best
expression of collective security was through economic
sanctions. This policy also had the advantage, according to
the collective security advocates, in that it night stop the
German fascists which was the goal of its primary advocate,
Freda Kirchwey. She was editor-in-chief and had a crusading
devotion to the destruction of fascism. The other editors at
The Nation also supported collective security. The one hold
out was Oswald Garrison Villard, and he supported the
American neutrality policy. However, Kirchwey could not
accept neutrality as she believed it would not halt fascism,
and just as importantly, it would not keep the United States
out of a war. Hitler would be free to continue with his
disruptive, aggressive aspirations if neutrality was
adopted.
The Nation felt Hitler had to pursue a forceful
policy to insure his dictatorship within the Third Reich.
"Hitler can only consolidate his dictatorship by pursuing an
aggressive foreign policy which, according to the Minister
for Propaganda, leads toward a Teutonic empire embracing all
the German-speaking peoples of Europe." 1 Dictators waging
1

Johannes Steel, "Europe Moves Toward War: V. The
Mechanics of Nationa1ism," T
Nation 138 (April 11,
1934):411.
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wars was nothing new explained The Nation. Despots
throughout history have had to consolidate themselves by
embarking upon spectacular foreign conquests. Hitler joined
the ranks of others such as: Alexander the Great, Julius
Ceasar, Cromwell, and Napoleon. 2 The Nation added that
Hitler had to pursue a belligerent foreign policy because of
the economic situation in Germany. Economic conditions had
grown progressively worse over the previous twelve months
and by 1934, conditions were extremely grim. The German
citizens were growing restive and disgruntled with Hitler's
regime. The journal believed it would become imperative for
Hitler to divert the Germans if he wanted to retain his
power. "The only way to distract attention from political
and economic developments within Germany is to embark on
foreign political adventures bringing 'conquest and
glory' • ,,3
The Nation feared that Hitler's foreign policy was
aimed at more than securing his position at home. He wanted
to control Europe as well, and this particular aspiration
was based, in part, on his sense of German history. The
National Socialists final goal for their foreign strategy
was the "restoration of the Holy Roman Empire of the
Germanic race and its far-flung border lines, along which
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Barbarossa's stalwart crusaders converged a thousand years
ago.,,4 These were the ultimate Nazi ambitions.
The Nation saw that part of Hitler's avowed foreign
policy was his promise to remove Germany from the
constraints of the Treaty of Versailles, which Germans felt
was an intolerable outrage against every German. This meant
that, in addition to other areas of the Treaty,

the sections

that took away German lands and colonies must be revised. As
soon as he was able, Hitler acted on his pledge.

In 1933,

Hitler left the League of Nations. In 1935, he freed Germany
from the disarmament clauses in the Treaty of Versailles.

In

1936, Hitler violated the Locarno Pact by moving German
troops into the Rhineland. As The Nation interpreted it,
Hitler's victory over the Rhineland issue dealt a severe
blow to the peace keeping system in Europe. The Locarno

ct

was held to be a primary peace keeper in Europe and it was
nullified by German actions. Also, the League of Nations was
substantially weakened when the member nations failed to act
on Germany's transgressions. Even so, The

continued

to support the principle of the League's sanctions. The
journal believed that the tactics and actions urged in
Hitler's Mein

constituted the backbone of Nazi policy

I~Ernest Schulz, "Germany Prepares for War,
137 (September 27, 1933):353.
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up to and including 1936. 5 The occupation of the Rhineland
was also part of Hitler's objective for the completion of a
European pan-Germanic empire. "Germany's immediate ambitions
lie toward the East, and to assure a free hand in such a
campaign Hitler desires above all else a guaranty of
stability in the West.,,6 With Germany once more in
possession of the Rhineland, German soldiers were on the
French border. France would not be able to come to the aid
of her allies to the East without, first,

contending with

the German army. This explained why Hitler occupied the
Rhineland before turning to the East. Actually Hitler
desired more than stability in the West as The Nation
observed later.
The Nation reported that the Nazis believed they had
economic justification for their foreign policy aspirations.
Nazi dreams of expansion were based on "economic theories
which have been evolved solely to suit these ambitions.,,7
Every nation, according to the Nazis, had to extend its
orbit of economic and political influence in order to
survive in the modern world. Germany's natural area of
economic and political influence extended from the Baltic
5Editorial, "Has Hitler Hon Out?," The Nation 142
(April 1, 1936):401.
6 Ibid .
7Johannes Steel, "Europe Moves Toward War: II.
Germany's Dream of Expansion," The Nation 138 (March 21,
1934):324.
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states to deep into the agricultural countries of the Balkan

region. The Nazis held that the creation of a Third Empire
would make Germany economically self-sufficient and
independent of other countries infl ence.
complement Hitler's racial,
appeal."

S

mystical,

"These theories

and

Furthermore, The Nation believed if one understood

the Nazi aspirations,

the drive to coordinate Austria with

Germany was not an end in itself;

it was instead "an initial

step in the realization of the Nazi dreams of a self
contained Third Reich stretching from the Baltic to the
Adriatic.,,9
What was The Nation's attitude toward the Nazi
expansionist plans? The weekly deplored the policy and
actions of the Nazis in Europe.

To begin with, The Nation

was not in agreement with the Nazi's economic justification.
It perceived,

instead,

that the National Socialists were

covering up their own personal ambitions. The Nation's
reaction can be summarized by Walter Duranty in a 1937
issue. Hitler and his minions were recognized as the "dark
forces"

in Europe. The struggle on the European continent

was believed to be one between two ideologies. Mr.
in his analysis,

Duranty,

cleverly took a statement of Hitler's that

there is a struggle between Civilization and the dark

ideologies going on in Europe.

It is the strug

cr
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forces.

Hitler meant that the National Socialists

represented Civilization. Duranty asked which is
Civilization and which are the dark forces. He accepted
Hitler's premise but reversed it. "There is a struggle of
ideologies going on in Europe. It is the struggle of cruelty
and reaction against all that noble men from Socrates to
Jefferson have fought for throughout history."lO All of
Europe was to be involved in the conflict which would result
when Nazi Germany moved to fulfill its aspirations. German
strategy was formulated by the Nazis to insure that their
goals for the Reich were realized. As early as 1934, the
Reich was seen to be at work endeavoring to carry out Nazi
policy. This was attempted in several different ways.
The Nation reported countries were infiltrated by
Nazis agents and cells were formed.

In most of the Baltic

states, these groups worked toward a "coordination" of all
other nations with the Nazi policies and goals. Nazi
propagandists worked day and night in Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia. These regions, however, were not to be the only
areas in Europe manipulated by the Nazi agents. In fact "at
this moment a closely knit network of spies and agents
provocateurs covers the whole of

rope."ll As an example,

1 atv a 1 t e r Du ran t y, " Hit 1 e r 's H0 use
Nation 144 (January 2, 1937): 10.

0

f Car d s ," The

llJohannes Steel, "Europe Moves Toward ~"ar: II.
Germany's Dream of Expansion," p. 325.
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after an investigation, the Dutch found that Nazi agents had
set up propaganda cells and organizational centers in
garages in Holland. Continuous propaganda expounding
Hitler's principles of racial and political discrimination
was maintained in most European countries in an endeavor to
weaken other countries governments. One of the key factors
in the Nazi propaganda work was their cells and associated
agents.
Another propaganda technique, used by the Nazis, was
delineated by The Nation. It was a petition made directly to
the Germans living in other countries. This appeal was for
the realization of a pan-Germanic movement, which was to
unite all Germans in the cause for the National Socialists
back home in the Fatherland. As early as 1930, the famous
program of twenty-five points of National Socialism
contained this sentence. "'We cannot give up a single German
in Sudeten Germany, in South Tyrol [changed in 1931 to
Alsace-Lorraine], in Poland, in the League of Nations colony
Austria, or in the succession states' ,,,12 This quotation
reveals that even prior to their succession to power in
1933, Hitler and his cohorts intended to appeal to and
manipulate Germans living in other European countries to
further Nazi ambitions and policies. Germans had settled in
areas allover Europe. They lived in areas from the Metz to
12Ludwig Lore, "Tyrol Germans Don't Count," The
Nation 146 (May 21, 1938):585.
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the Volga, from the Gulf of Finland to Serbia. "National
Socialism spares no effort to inspire in these Teutonic

minorities a spirit of rebellion against their respective
govern r] " ,

.,,13 "If these groups with their Nazi leadership

were not able to gain control of other governments directly,
they were in place for future use by Hitler. He intended,
through his manipulations and proposed takeovers of other
governments, to complete his foreign policy aspirations.
As early as 1934, The Nation understood that the key
to European peace was in the hands of the French who
seemingly missed their opportunity to halt the Germans.
After the election of Hitler and the Nazis, if France and
her European allies had marched into Germany little
resistance would have been offered.

14

Since 1933, the

Germans had broken the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of
Versailles by rearming. By 1934, rearmament in Germany had
advanced considerably. France's first step would have been
to demand the League of Nations make an inquiry into German
armaments under Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles.
Daladier and France took no such action; again the French
missed their opportunity. Even with much ground being lost
by 1934, The Nation believed France still had the

13Henrr C. Wolfe, "fascism Charts Its Course," The
144 (January 2, 1937):17.
14Robert Dell, "\.Jill Germany Conquer France?," The
138 (April 18, 1934):441.
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opportunity to defend civilization from the "barbarians."
"[O]ne hopes and believes, in the power of France to
organize the forces necessary for that defense and to
repulse the new barbarian invasion.
.

European

If France fails,

'1'lzatlon
.
.
1 ost. filS E
lS
urope'sl ast c h ance f or

C~Vl

peace was to be determined by the French reaction to German
policies.
The Nation considered France to be a relatively
strong country after the war, and that it was not bothered
by Hitler in the early years of his dictatorship. But what
of the other countries that were not as strong and
resourceful as France? Certainly Hitler wanted to dominate
other nations, and these aspirations were part of his
foreign policy. It also appeared that Germany would probably
not have to fight to gain most of that dominance. Hitler
realized that many Europeans did not want to fight after the
devastation of World War I. The costs of the last war were
still fresh in the minds and hearts of most people.
According to The Nation, Hitler's attempted conquest
of Austria was lIa subtle and dangerous experiment in
bloodless belligerence.,,16 Assimilation of Austria was one
of the top foreign policy aims of the early Nazi regime.
Pan-Germanism was the same as Hitlerism. The Nazis wanted to
ISIbid.
16 John Gunther, "Danger Still in Austria," The
Nation 137 (September 20, 1933):320.
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assert the pure and dominant unity of the German nation by
absorbing Austria. In 1933, 6.5 million Austrians were of
German decent, a full quarter of the Austrian population. 17
Furthermore, Hitler wanted to achieve an Anschluss with
Austria. He gambled that direct warfare need not be the
method used to achieve his goals. Germany was neither fully
prepared for war nor was it necessary if a less violent
method could gain the result Hitler wanted. Political and
economic forces were brought to bear upon Austria by
Germany.
Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor, refused to
acquiesce to Nazi demands and propaganda; the more the Nazis
attacked Dollfuss, assessed The Nation, the better pretext
he had to rule semi-dictatorially. This in a sense was a
defeat for the Nazis because they needed an electoral
success for victory. Dollfuss, by adducing the gravity of
the crisis, staved off general elections almost
indefinitely. The Austrians believed they were but the first
step in the fulfillment of a pan-Germanic Nazi policy.
Dollfuss himself believed this: "if the Nazis take Austria
they will inevitably turn toward Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia
next, even to Switzerland and Denmark.,,18

17 Ibid .
18 Ibid .,

p.

322.
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However, The Nation knew the fight for Austrian

independence would not be easy. It believed Dollfuss faced
great dangers -there were four obstacles to maintaining
Austrian indepenrI nce. These impediments were:

the geIJ"al

apathy of the Austrian people, the strategic difficulty of
fighting a civil and external action at the same time,

the

overwhelming burden of the economic crisis, and treason in
the form of wholesale defection of the Heimwehr to the Nazi
camp. In addition to these difficulties,

the Austrians were

a kindly people whose government behaved with appalling
lenience. Most Austrians did not seem to be aware of the
nature of their enemy, the Nazis. For example, an official
Austrian communique regretted the necessity of jailing
rebellious Nazis; "it mentioned Austria's hope that the Nazi
invasion could be handled in a

'knightly spirit'." The

Nation could not believe Austrian naivety and responded
with, "[k]nightly spirit my eyeball! The only treatment a
Nazi understands is a mallet on his head.,,19 The weekly
observed the Austrian national character to be much too
naive when it carne to understanding what the Nazis were
about.
The Nation viewed Dollfuss as a reactionary
parochialist who also had dictatorial aspirations. He was
still better than the Nazis, according to one view at the
19 John Gunther, "Keeping Hitler Out of Austria,"
Nation 138 (February 14, 1934):180.
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weekly. Dollfuss had one saving grace: his courage and
tenacity were keeping the Nazis out of power in Austria. In
fact, The Nation believed "[f]or the Nazis to take Austria
would be a major European tragedy. Therefor, re

etting

much in his policy, I support Dollfuss so long as he does
his job, the supreme job of saving Austria from Hitler.,,20
Although one view at The

tion perceived Dollfuss

as better than Hitler, another view held Dollfuss was almost
as bad as Hitler. The worse thing for Austrian independence
was Dollfuss' dictatorship; in fact,

"the dictatorship [was]

Austria's weakness.,,21 In order to maintain his power,
Dollfuss had to weaken and destroy the social democrats and
rely upon the Heimwehr to a great extent. Dollfuss was doing
the Nazis'
fascism.

job for them, destroying groups that had opposed

Instead, he relied upon the Heimwehr, which would

support an authoritarian state, whether it was his or the
Nazis did not matter. What would enable the Austrians to
defeat the Nazi campaign? It certainly was not going to be
Dollfuss. The journal believed there was an alternative
direction for Austria. "The only way in which Austria could
offer resistance to .

. German fascism and thus give real

content to the present empty slogan of Austrian independence

20 Ibid ., p. 181.
21Louis Fischer, "Arms Over Europe: Austria Dams the
Nazi Flood," The Nation 142 (February 26,1936):247.

82
would be to set up a democratic government.,,22 A democracy
would have a chance of keeping the Nazis out of Austria. A
dictatorship would surely encourage it.
By late 1934, Th

Nation recognized that Austria and

Dollfuss would not be able to hold out forever against the
Nazis. What would be the consequences of a Nazi take over
for the Austrians? The weekly believed that National
Socialism would certainly not benefit the Austrians and
other nationalities living in Austria. In fact,

the

consequences of Nazi rule would be dire indeed. Aside from
being the completion of the first step in the Nazi pan
Germanic dream of a Third Reich which would extend from the
Baltic to the Adriatic, Hitler had other plans, as well, for
the Austrians.
However, Th

Nation asked what of the 400,000 Jews

who lived in Austria? If the Nazis applied their maternal
grandmother test,

they would have "at least a million

victims which they can sacrifice to their insane racial
theories.,,23 German National Socialist rule in Austria would
also mean displacement or the concentration camp for tens of
thousands of non-Jewish writers, artists, teachers,
scientists, and any other persons who were connected to the

22 Ibid •
23Johannes Steel, !fEuro e Moves Toward War: I. The
Bloody Danube and Beyond," The
i n 138 (March 7,
---1934):270
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Socialists or Marxists. 24 In addition, most of Austria's

political, cultural, and social life would be replaced by
Nazi ideology.
The Nation wanted to discover what the overthrow of
the Austrian government would mean for the rest of Europe.
The immediate threat from the Nazis would be to the Little
Entente. Nazi propaganda would naturally take advantage of
the moral effect the German victory in Austria would create
in the German minorities in the Little Entente. In fact,
Nazi propaganda, which was already penetrating the Balkans,
"would then issue an appeal to the many German minorities
scattered allover Southeastern and Central Europe.,,25
Victory for the Nazis in Austria would give them the means
to continue their effective work and propaganda in other
European countries.
When Anschluss finally came to Austria on February
15, 1938, The Nation was not surprised. After all,
coordination with Austria was the policy Germany had worked
for since 1934. Once Germany had absorbed the Austrian
state, its population rose to 73 million while France's
population was at 42 million. Germany was well on its way to
becoming the dominant power of Continental Europe. 26 The
24 Ibid .
25 Ibid •
26Ludwig Lore, "Austria--Last Chapter," The Nation
146 (February 26, 1938):235.
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democracies of Europe had failed to stand up to the Nazi
dictatorship. In fact,

by allowing Germans to bring troops

to her border with the reoccupation of the formerly
demilitarized area in 1936, France made it impossible for
its armies to come to the aid of its allies in Eastern
Europe. In an editorial, The Nation summed up the Austrian
Anschluss as it perceived the outcome. Austria was the first
step into the abyss with the results uncertain for the rest
of Europe. "For in failing to take a stand against fascist
aggression while they have overwhelming military
preponderance, the democracies are not only making a world
war inevitable, but are endangering their chances of victory
when it comes.,,27
Czechoslovakia, predicted The Nation, would be next.
At the very least Czechoslovakia would face dismemberment
and division by Germany, Poland, and Hungary.28 Certainly as
some believed, with German soldiers now on the CzechoslovakAustrian border, Czechoslovakia faced the immediate danger
of being the next nation to be swallowed by Germany.29 The
partition of Czechoslovakia meant there was an imminent
threat for the rest of the region from the Nazis.

27Editorial, The Nation 146 (February 26, 1938):233.
28

Ludwig Lore, "Austria -Last Chapter," p.235.

29Robert Dell, "Europe Learns from Vienna," Th
Nation 146 (March 19, 1938):320.
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e Nation understood as early as 1937 that
Czechoslovakia was the key to central Europe. If the Nazis
could destroy the Czech democracy,

then the road down the

Danube would be open for further Nazi aggression. 30 Because
of their pan-Germanic aspirations, the German fascists
needed a territory that would provide a reservoir of raw
materials and an outlet for their surplus population.
Czechoslovakia would certainly fulfill both needs for the
Nazis. Czechoslovakia "is slated to be the first nation to
fall beneath Hitler's chariot wheels in his

nach

Osten.,,31
The Nation was not fooled by Hitler's demands of
self-determination for the Germans in the Sudetenland. The
weekly was certain he aspired to much more. This was,

in

essence, a call for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. 32
Hitler's demands, essentially, confirmed that Germany was
"not interested so much in 'rescuing' the Sudeten Germans as
in bringing the whole of Czechoslovakia within the German
" h "lS strategy f ormu I ated earlier:
or b lOt . 1133 H"It I er was uSlng

reliance upon the existence of Germans in other countries to
30Hen rye. \.J 0 I fe, " Na z i Eye sTu r n Ea s t ," T
145 (November 6, 1937):502.

Nation

31 Ibid ., p. 504.
32 ,HIlS
.
F"lSC h er, "\.Jhy Germany Feared ~"ar,
Nation 147 (November 12, 1938):505.

33Editorial, "If Hitler Has His l..Jay,"
(October 1, 1938):312.
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further his racial,

pan-Germanic aspirations. The rest of

Europe was, indeed, threatened. In fact, capitulation of
Czechoslovakia would undercut Hungary's defenses against
complete Nazi domination. But the Nazis had not intended to
stop with Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
A prostrate Czechoslovakia is clearly but a means to an
end. It would remove the last barrier to Hitler's
control of Central Europe, and would lay the basis for
early demands for Memel, Danzig, Schlesing, South Tyr~!,
and other territories partially populated by Germans.
The

felt Czechoslovakia was betrayed by the

English and French agreement with Hitler at Munich.
Additionally, the partition of Czechoslovakia, by and with
the consent of France and Great Britain, had given Hitler
another form of victory, according to the weekly. Hitler's
demands were based on the relationship of racial status to
political status. In other words, a person's racial
derivation established his political adherence. Sudeten
Germans, though Czechoslovakian citizens, had the right to
self-determination under German rule because of their German
racial heritage. The Nation quoted GSring speaking to
Germans abroad:
The National Socialist government expects every German
residing abroad to put the interest of his Fatherland
before his own. You Germans abroad must remember, that
wherever you are, you represent the interests of
Germany. Always remember that the Fatherland comes first

34 Ibid .
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and the rest of the world after. The German living 35
abroad can be nothing else but a National Socialist.
Prior to the partition of Czechoslovakia, The Nation
believed, Nazi racial theory was nothing but propaganda. It
was the

~azi

claim to Czechoslovakia, British, and French

acquiescence to this racial claim which raised Nazi
propaganda to the level of a principle of international
action and Xazi right. 36 The acceptance of the Nazi racial
proposition, by the two leading democracies in Europe, was
perceived by The Nation as a direct threat to the United
States. Hitler's racial propaganda, established as a
principle in Europe, was anathema to Americans. Race was
left behind by the immigrants from Europe when they came to
the New World. People of many different racial stocks came
to the American colonies not to found a new race,
peop 1 e. 37 Amer~cans
0

0

but a

f German d escent dOd
~
not owe t h e~r
0

allegiance to their Fatherland as the Nazis suggested. Nor
did the victory of Xazi racial theory bode well for the rest
of Europe either. Europe appeared to be on the brink of war.
In the meantime, Hitler's policy had come to fruition and
"Germany, the only country in Europe capable of plunging
Europe into a general war, has won a hand. The new cards are

35Archibald ~1acLeish, "Hunich and the Americans,1f
(October 15, 1938):370-71.
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36 Ibid ., p. 371.
37 Ibid .
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in the hands of the potential aggressor.,,38 Initiative Has
now with Hitler.
When Hitler demanded Danzig and the Corridor, The
Nation kneH this was Hitler's next step in his scheme for
the completion of his pan-Germanic policy. After the
destruction of Czechoslovakia and the assessment of Munich,
as a failure for gaining European security, the only
question for the journal was Hhether there Hould be another
Munich or not. Would Great Britain and France comply with
Hitler's demands this time around? One crucial, key element
that affected Hitler's tactics Hould be the reaction of the
Poles. Poland stood firm;

they refused German and Soviet

demands. Hitler would have to fight to obtain Poland. 39 This
time, with Poland, most Europeans finally realized that
treaties and agreements could not be made Hith Hitler. He
broke everyone made prior to his demands for Polish
territory. What was to guarantee European security? It
certainly was not going to be agreements made Hith Hitler.
"A feeling of having their backs to the vfall has united the
democracies and clarified the issue as one of totalitarian
domination.,,40 One could almost hear a sigh of relief
38 John Gunther, "The Rhineland Crisis," The Nation
142 (April 1, 1936) :408.
39

Henry B. Kranz, "Poland and the German 'Peace'
The Nation 147 (September 19, 1938):533.
40Aylmer Vallance, "No Munich," The Nation 149
(September 2, 1939):236.
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expressed by The Nation with the report of the European
democracies finally unifying against Hitler. The independent
press, including The Nation, had asserted for years "that
Hitler couldn't be bargained with.!,41 Most of the countries
in Europe had come to realize Hitler's pan-Germanic policy
was an organized system of persecution that would eventually
crush their political and economic liberties. "[T]he
governments of the Western nations must fight for their
existence.

,,,42 Conditions could only grow worse under a

National Socialist foreign policy that was growing
increasingly belligerent and aggressive in the Nazis'
attempt to fulfill the objectives of Hein Kampf.

~lost

now

believed Hitler was using Danzig and the Corridor as an
excuse to gain a greater objective--Poland, which would go
the way of Czechoslovakia. "It is universally recognized
that the problem of Danzig is merely incidental, but
concessions based on a reliance of Nazi good-will are vetoed
as involving a crisis under conditions progressively
deteriorating. 1t43
The Nation discerned that Hitler did not expect the
democracies to declare war against Germany over the Polish
issue. "Hitler obviously believed to the end, in spite of

h

41Freda Kirchwey, "Munich Bears Fruit," (Editorial)
Nation 149 (September 9, 1939):259.
42 Ibid ., p. 260.
43 Aylmer Vallance, "No Munich," p. 236.
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rearmament and conscription and the slowly growing peace
front,

that he could have his way without war.,,44 Hitler's

diplomatic coup in Moscow with the non-aggression pact and
the British attempts to negotiate to the very end probably
helped to deceive Hitler. The democracies had drawn the
line; Germany could no longer step over it without war. When
the demands came for Danzig and the Corridor, France and
England were prepared. They ultimately must have expected
Hitler's actions as their war preparations had been swift.
They had finally learned not to trust Hitler's promises
either.
Nazi foreign policy was based on the destruction of
the Treaty of Versailles, the Locarno Pact, and the
weakening of the League of Nations. Hitler's actions grew
progressively more aggressive in seeking his goals. He
obtained the land, people, and resources Germany needed and
wanted in their bid to carry out his racial, economic, and
political policies expounded in Mein Kampf. In the process,
all hope for a collective security was destroyed. During the
period from 1934 to 1939, while Hitler's policy grew more
aggressive, what had been The Nation's reactions to Nazi
policy? What conduct for the United States did the weekly
advocate in response to Hitler's destruction of peace in
Europe?

4 4 F red a Ki r c h we y, "!,-1 u n i c h Be a r s F r u it," p. 260 .
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During the five year period from 1934 to the
beginning of the war in Europe in 1939, The Nation ran many
editorials and articles on Nazi foreign policy. Its beliefs
on how Germany should be dealt with by the United States and
other European nations were clearly expressed. The Nation's
key belief was that Hitler and Germany must be contained at
the very least, and if at all possible, Nazi Germany must be
cut off from the rest of Europe and strangled. If Germany,
in 1934, was allowed to rearm then what? Rearmament would
surely lead to another war unless the Nazis were stopped.
"[W]ill they [the French] permit Hitler to continue to arm
and to violate the Treaty of Versailles without acting? If
so, they will find themselves in an armament race which can
have only one ending.,,45 This ending, of course, would be
war. The Nation was well aware that a preventive war was out
of the question in 1934. There was too much pacifist
sentiment in both Great Britain and France for there to be
another war. What then was the answer for both the European
powers and the United States? In answer to this question,
many liberal views were expressed and examined in the
journal. Neutrality, collective security expressed through
sanctions, and new isolationism were the main avenues
explored as answers in Th

Nation. However, the editorials

and the preponderance of articles clearly favored and
45 Ed ltorla
·
. 1 , "Disarmament Retreats," T e Nation 138
(May 2, 1934):495.
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supported one position, collective security expressed
through sanctions. One other person, Villard, the former
editor and owner, supported neutrality. His position can
hardly be expressed as equally dominant with collective
security in The

~ation.

Neutrality was very much a minority

opinion.
Both the supporters of collective security and
Villard wanted to keep Americans out of any involvement with
an eventual war in Europe. Villard and the editors
disagreed, primarily, on how this goal was to be attained.
They, also, diverged on whether the destruction of German
fascism was a necessity that required their support. For
Kirchwey, one of the goals of any policy she supported must
be the eventual destruction of fascism.

In an editorial in

1935, The Nation came out in support of sanctions as a
method for dealing with Hitler and the Nazis. German fascism
had to be contained and stamped out; in this way, it was
compared to an epidemic. "The truth is that once a major war
has started, the chances of remaining out of it are slim. As
in combating an epidemic, the best strategy is to prevent
the virus from gaining a foothold.,,46 Sanctions would put
commercial and financial pressures on the Nazis, and it
would be futile to invoke economic measures against Germany
without the full cooperation of the United States. The
4 6 Ed ito ria 1, " San c t ion s
(September 4, 1935):256.
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Nation believed sanctions were the alternative to war that
both Europeans and Americans could support. Because the
United States could assist in this way, sanctions might have
a chance at success. All other measures that were tried had
failed. Diplomacy, with its compromises and concessions, had
not been successful and moral suasion had been futile as
well with the fascists.

"Sanctions may also fail,

but they

present the sole alternative to war.,,47 Certainly,
collective security expressed through sanctions was not the
sole alternative, but it was the only one, according to its
supporters at Th

Nation, that would be successful in

containing the Nazis.
Proponents of collective security at

he Nation

realized that all economic sanctions were, essentially,
backed by a military preparedness to protect each other from
the aggressions of Hitler. However, there were some
advocates of collective action at the weekly who believed
economic measures might not be enough to contain the
"barbarian" Nazis. This was one view expressed in The
Nation. "The barbarian invasion will not be repulsed by
pacts or conventions. It will be repulsed only by
force--perhaps economic force might be enough, although I
doubt it, but it will have to be force of some kind.,,48
47 Ibid •
441.

48 Robert Dell, "\-.'ill Germany Conquer France?," p.

94
Hitler and the Nazis were the barbarian forces. Barbarians
are classified as such because they reject civilization's
laws and use coercion to achieve their own aims. Barbarians
can not be reasoned with, unless it suits their own goals.
Force is what barbarians understand. The future for Europe
looked bleak because
those in France and elsewhere who have been so much
afraid of any resort to force that they have capitulated
to threats and yielded to blackmail may find themselves
obliged to resort to force in much less favorable
conditions. It is poss~~le to precipitate war by being
too much afraid of it.
The editors of The Nati n had been fighting the
adoption of nondiscriminatory neutrality legislation for
years. They believed laws could be enacted which would give
the President the authority "to lift the embargo on
shipments to a state .
invaded.

which has been unjustly

· · ·
y sens1tlve
pOlnt·
W1t h
. ,,50 Th'1S was an extreme l

the journal. Current U.S. neutrality legislation hindered
the fulfillment of American obligations to other democratic
nations. The United States must be allowed to direct an
embargo against aggressor nations and not the victims. If
the Neutrality Act was allowed to stand, without amendment,
then Americans would find themselves in the untenable
position of supporting the Nazis. "Neutrality followed to

49 Ibid .
50Editorial, "Strengthening the Neutrality Act,"
Nation 142 (January 8, 1936):32

e

95
its logical conclusion has made America effectively profascist.,,51

Another point of the sanctions argument stressed

that if any policy was to work at containing or destroying
the fascists in Europe,

it had to be collective in nature.

Sanctions would not work unless there was a certainty of
collective enactment. This was recognized as early as 1933
when The Nation first advocated economic sanctions against
Germany as the "one weapon they fear.,,52 The Nazis dreaded
economic pressure;

they realized international enforcement

of economic sanctions would "kill even the monster they had
created.,,53
The supporters of collective security were not
totally opposed to neutrality.

They realized the end goals

for both neutrality and collective action were the same:
prevention of U.S.

involvement in a war with the Nazis.

the
"To

much in the argument of the neutrality advocates we can give
unqualified support. ,,54 The aspects of neutrality that the
weekly favored,

however,

were not in American policy.

As a

consequence, The Nation could not support American
neutrality.

51Louis Fischer, "Keeping America Out of \var," The
Nation 144 (March 27, 1937):349.
52Richard Neuberger,

"The New Germany," p.

379.

53 Ibid .
54Editorial, "Pro-Fascist Neutrality," The Nation
144 (January 9, 1937):33.

96
Advocates of collective security at The Nation
believed it was "the greatest possible measure of war
prevention."SS It was a simple plan once agreed upon. If one
nation was attacked by an aggressor, like Germany, then all
nations, united by a collective security agreement, would
march against Germany to stop the aggression. By 1936,
Germany was one of the most powerful nations in Europe and
the "safety of the European powers lies in combinations
which will offset Germany's superiority. This is the germ
idea of collective security."S6 The Nation supported the
United States, France, England, and the Soviet Union as
being the foundation in worldwide collective security. The
journal ascertained these countries had interests in common,
not only in Europe, but in the Far East as well. Th

Nation,

in general, supported the involvement of the Soviet Union in
a proposed collective security policy put forth in 1935.
During the same year,

the h'eekly responded to the "olive

branch" offered by Hoscow. The Third International met in
the Soviet Union and "has called for a united labor party of
all groups in every country which oppose fascism.,,57 This
was a policy the Soviet Union needed to promulgate. If their

~'Jar,"

55LouiS Fischer, "The Soviets Face the Threat of
The Nation 142 (April 8,1936):442.
56 Ibid •

57Editorial, "Hoscow Offers an Olive Branch," The
Nation 141 (August 7, 1935):145.
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plan was successful, the Soviets would have substantially
strengthened their defenses. The Nation realized that Soviet
motivation was based on self-interest. Nevertheless, that
. "
. .lmportance. ,,58
was no reason " to oppose or to mlnlmlze
ltS

The Soviet Union was threatened by Nazi Germany, as all the
nations of Europe were menaced by the economic and political
aspirations of the Third Reich. The weekly believed that the
compelling logic of self-preservation should have brought
about an alliance of liberals and communists as they must
foster a united front to defeat their common enemy--the
German fascists. The Nation summed up its belief in the
importance of the !'toscow offer. "The hope of the world may
depend upon the reality behind the pronouncement of the
Third International at Noscow.,,59 In addition, the USSR was
willing to compromise: "to buttress the status quo the
Kremlin is prepared to consider sympathetically any new
scheme for European collective security.

.,,60 But beyond

the collective security alliance of the four nations and the
economic sanctions, the journal expressed little else in the
way of a concrete program.
Freda Kirchwey, the managing editor until 1937 and
afterwards the owner of T

Nation, accepted the Soviet

58 Ibid •

59 Ibid .
\~ar,"

60LouiS Fischer,
p.444.
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Kirchwey was a staunch supporter of the Soviet Union. She
hoped the USSR would eventually fulfill its promise of a
worker state. Freda had been actively involved in labor
causes and felt there was "an urgent need to alleviate the
bleak conditions of the masses.,,62 Even though she supported
the Soviets, continued repression by Stalin in Russia made
it difficult for her to sustain her endorsement. The
ideological struggle between Stalin and Trotsky and the
purges begun by Stalin in 1934 which continued to 1938,
jeopardized a united front against German fascism.
Nevertheless, Kirchwey with the concurrence of two of her
editors, Max

rner and Maxwell Stewart, continued her

support of the Kremlin because
the collective security system against fascism was at
stake. She adopted a moral stance of good versus the
evil of fascism and an expedient stance regarding the
Soviet Union. Because she regarded the Soviet Union as a
flawed but necessary ally, she put it on the side of
good and downplayed Soviet totalitarianism, which she
considered temporary. A moralist against ~~scism, she
was a relativist toward the Soviet Union.
Kirchwey aligned The Nation with the Soviets,
against German fascism, even though the Soviet Union
continued its suppression of supposed Russian
counterrevolutionaries. Liberals who believed Stalin was as
61

Sara Alpern.

62 Ibid •
63 Ibid .• p. 119.

Kirchwey, p. 103.
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great an enemy as Hitler had difficulty with her stance.

64

One of her critics responded with: "I believe in all-around

disarmament also but not in moral disarmament.,,65 Kirchwey
downplayed her critics censure, believing a disagreement
would create a split of the left. 66 Kirchwey's all-consuming
passion became the desire for the destruction of Hitler and
fascism.
Villard was not in agreement with Kirchwey and the
board of editors and their opinions concerning the Soviets,
at least not by 1935. Villard had admired Soviet pacifism.
His opinion of Moscow changed after the trials of 1934-35
and the subsequent killings. As far as Villard was concerned
there was no difference between Stalin and Hitler. Coldblooded murder and tyranny, whether fascist or bolshevist,
was still murder and tyranny. "Slaughter is slaughter, and

64Included in the detractors of Kirchwey's position,
were three of her own editors, Robert Bendiner, who became
managing editor in 1938, Joseph Wood Krutch and Margaret
Harshall. All three editors were anti-Stalinists. Michael
Wreszin, Oswald Garrison Villard, p. 253.
65Sidney Hook to Freda Kirchwey, June 8, 1939, #153,
FK MSS, cited in Sara Alpern,
Kirchwey, p. 126.
66

Sara Alpern, Freda Kirchwey, pp. 125-26. Kirchwey
also believed the pro-Soviet groups would create a rift on
the left as their uncritical approval of Stalin would create
dissension among liberals. Kirchwey viewed the Soviets as
acceptable but not necessarily desirable allies, and she
criticized their policy accordingly.
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remains such by whomever it is done.,,67 Villard believed
himself to still be old-fashioned, and for him "the end
never justifies the means, and no good social order can be
established by bloodshed." 68 Consequently, he could not
accept the Soviets even if they were out to protect
themselves and others from the Nazis. His sense of moral
order was rigid; he believed "in moral laws, in certain
moral imponderables and inevitabilities.,,69 Villard never
under any circumstance was willing to deviate from his
stance.
In an article debating the values of neutrality
versus sanctions, the reasons why The Nation expected the
failure of American neutrality were clearly exposed.
Neutrality was opposed because "it requires equal treatment
of two belligerents without regard to the nature and origin
of their conflict.,,70 Equal treatment, The Nation
recognized, was impossible to achieve. No nation could
remain indifferent to the nature of a conflict and the
principle of equal treatment. This was especially true in
670swald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men: The
Russians i'lurder Again," Th Nation 140 (January 23,
1935) :91.
68 Ibid •
690swald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Hen: The
Russian 'Purging' ," The :'Jation 139 (December 26, 1934) :729.
70Raymond Gram Swing, "Sanctions vs. Neutrality: A
Debate The Case for Sanctions," The Nation 141 (December 4,
1935):641.
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the case of the United States. Neutrality must involve
complete impartiality. Was this possible for the United
States? The Nation answered no.
We must treat aggressor and aggrieved with complete
equality. Such impartiality, or disinterestedness, might
be possible for the residents of Samoa or even
Argentina, but it is out of the question for Americans.
As a leading creditor and as one of the chief commercial
nations in the world, the United States is inextricably
involved in world events. No great imperialistic power,
with commitments in all parts of the earth can be truly
neutral unless it vol~ytarily chooses to renounce its
widespread interests.
In addition, the lure of profits, in a society which exalts
profitmaking, was likely to transcend any legislation
including neutrality measures. Neutrality would not be a
guaranty against the United States being drawn into a war.
By 1936, the United States had enacted the
Neutrality Act which was obviously not the answer endorsed
by collective security advocates at The Nation. The weekly
observed the strong isolationist sentiment that existed
throughout the United States in 1936. Consequently, if
neutrality was to be approved, collective security
supporters at The Nation advocated the adoption of
neutrality legislation that would not be inconsistent with
the struggle for a worldwide collective security. Current
American neutrality legislation, in addition to promoting a
nondiscriminatory position, was also weak in other areas.

71Editorial, "Can We Be Neutral?,"
(February 12, 1936):173.
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The legislation had to be altered. To begin with, provisions
should be included that would require all trade with
belligerents be carried on at the risk of the trader.
Current neutrality legislation did not carry this provision,
and according to The Nation, this was one of the reasons the
United States became embroiled in the last war.

72

Also,

based on the experiences of World War I, The Nation wanted
the neutrality legislation to include mandatory embargoes,
not only on war materials but on credit and loans as well
which the current legislation did not provide for.

In

addition, the Neutrality Act did not stop trade in
commodities such as iron scrap, oil, and copper. Effective
neutrality legislation must call for the embargo of these
and other war materials. Their restriction was essential in
maintaining the United States' neutrality. The legislation
that was finally adopted in 1936 was a far cry from what was
necessary to keep the United States truly neutral. It did
not contain the measures The Nation considered essential. In
fact,

the current neutrality legislation was

no more than a breeder of delusions, that it will break
down in the event of another world war, that another war
is coming, that we shall be ultimately drawn in; that it
would be better for us .
[to take] some other form
of collective action, to throw our weight on the side of
peace and against aggression. 73
72Editorial, "Strengthening the Neutrality Act," The
Nation 142 (January 8, 1936):32.
73

Geoffrey Stone, "Neutrality--A Dangerous Hyth,"
The Nation 145 (September 18, 1937):283
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U.S. profit makers opposed the embargoes The Nation
believed were necessary, and as a consequence they were not
incorporated in the neutrality legislation. Therefore, the
United States best protection against war lay in the
prevention rather than the quarantine of war, "and wars
cannot be prevented except through collective action.,,74 The
periodical could not support the American neutrality law as
passed in 1936.
By 1937, The Nation dropped most of its attempts to
alter neutrality legislation and became a more determined
opponent to neutrality. This trend was due to Hitler's
activities and because neutrality was seen as an eventual
path to war. Many events had occurred by 1937 that caused
The Nation to become more determined in its position.

75

The

Rhineland Crisis, the Spanish Civil war, and other
belligerent actions by Hitler revealed to the periodical
further evidence of the true nature of the Nazis and that
divergent views on the left would not stop German fascism.
As a result, week after week the journal denounced American
neutrality. The Nation believed neutrality could not prevent
United States involvement in the deteriorating European
situation. Neutrality, of a sort, was being used as a tool

32.

74Editorial, "Strengthening the Neutrality Act," p.

75 Also at this time, The Nation was sold to Freda
Kirchwey, and her support of the Soviet Union carne to
dominate The Nation1s position after 1937.
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by Hitler to further his

pan-Ger~anic

policy. In fact,

Hitler, according to The Nation, was an eager supporter of
neutrality because it was paving the way to victory for the
Nazis. By attacking one country at a time, Hitler used his
support of neutrality to keep other nations out of his
disagreements. Only the aggressor and the attacked would
fight in Hitler's model of neutrality. Using neutrality as a
cover, Hitler would eventually control all of Europe.

76 If

the U.S. continued to follow this kind of policy,
eventually, Americans would not be able to remain impartial.
Continued reliance upon neutrality under these circumstances
would force the U.S. into the position of aiding Hitler.77
The lone opponent to collective security at The
Nation was Oswald Garrison Villard. Instead, he supported
mandatory neutrality. Villard had never favored Hitler's
regime. In 1935, he believed that Hitler's government was
one of the worst to ever exist. In fact,

IIfor the first time

in history a great government was being run by gangsters and
with gangster methods." 78 Not only was Germany under the
thumb of a dictator,

but Villard envisioned Hitler as a

7 6 E d ito ria l, " Ne u t r ali t y Ma k e s Iv' a r ,II T h
(February 20, 1937):200.
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780swald Garrison Villard, IIIssues and Men:
Government by Gangsters,1I The Nation 141 (August 7,
1935):147
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threat to the whole world. "As long as the Hitler Government
remains, it is a menace to the peace and welfare of the
world, to democratic institutions, to liberty and humanity
everywhere." 79 Although Villard recognized that the Nazis
were dangerous and a hazard to every other nation in Europe,
he supported neutrality. Villard's position was to cause a
rift with the rest of the staff at The Nation. The split
became so pronounced that the disagreement took place openly
in the pages of the journal. By 1937, Villard's tone began
to change. First of all, he asserted that the proposal of
the Secretary of State to allow the President to decide
"between the aggressor and the aggrieved seems to
insure [Americans] taking part in future wars.,,80 Villard
opposed discretionary embargoes and advocated mandatory
embargoes against all belligerents with no distinction
between the aggressor or the aggrieved. Not only did Villard
support neutrality, he believed it was the only insurance
that the U.S. would stay out of war. He decried any future
involvement of the United States as "setting ourselves up as
judges in a war with which we have no concern.,,81 Villard
not only thought a European war was not the concern of the
79

Oswald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men: The
Boycott of Germany," The N ion 139 (September 19,
1934):315.
800swald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Nen," The
Nation 144 (January 2, 1937):19.
81 Ibid .
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U.S., he also believed Americans could become embroiled on
the wrong side. He asked how America was to know with
certainty which side was the aggressor. 82 Villard was not
certain that Hitler was the enemy. This position was a far
cry from his original belief that the Nazis were the
opponents of democracy and peace. The Nation could not
support Villard's new outlook as it seemed absurd to not
know that Hitler was the enemy. The weekly maintained its
belief that Villard's point of view would create an
advantage for Hitler. Any position that cut off trade to the
aggrieved during a war gave direct aid to the aggressor. For
Villard to continue to support neutrality, meant he had to
retract his former convictions about German fascism.
Villard's ability to reverse himself put him in an
uncomfortable moral position, or at least the weekly
believed as much.
By early 1939, after the Austria Anschluss and the
agreement in Munich, The Nation acknowledged that if events
continued unchecked, the United States "shall be forced, in
order to survive, to fit into a framework of a Nazi
world.,,83 The United States was faced with a crumbling world
order evidenced by the unsuccessful attempts by the British
and French to appease Hitler. The old rules and methods were

82 Ibid •
83Freda Kirchwey, "Loving Hitler Less," (Editorial)
The Nation 148 (March 25, 1939):338.
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not workable because of Hitler. The

n knew that the

~~~~

existing Neutrality Law would have to be altered to permit
sales of essential supplies to the non-fascist powers in
Europe in the event of war. In addition, the United States
should be involved in discussion with these same countries
on ways of other possible resistance. This did not mean that
The Nation gladly supported France and Great Britain. The
weekly believed that these powers were only a lesser evil
than Germany. It did not approve of the way the Spanish
Civil war and, especially, the Czechoslovakian matter had
been handled. These countries had been sold down the river
and virtually murdered by the British and French. "Flanked
by the corpses of Spain and Czechoslovakia, the powers now
move to 'stop Hitler'. And they ask the United States to
help.

• We are faced with an alternative of evils.,,84

However unhappy the choice between governments, the United
States had to, eventually, support democracies over fascist
powers. The conquest of Europe by the Nazis would only lead
to the subjugation of the people of the world. German
fascist rule would, for many years, obliterate human
freedom. Certainly, France and Great Britain could not be
trusted to create a democratic and peaceful Europe as
evidenced by their imperialistic nature; however, they were
a better alternative than Hitler. "It is not that we love

84 Ibid .
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Chamberlain and Daladier more but that we love Hitler
less." 8S The Nation's position, at this point, as at all
times, revealed its liberal standing. It wanted a free,
democratic, and peaceful Europe--all liberal tenets, but it
was also realistic enough to know what its choices meant.
But another principle of liberalism -pacifism came
into disfavor with

he Nation. The weekly, which had held

pacifist views in 1914, came to accept the belief that no
action or policy would keep the United States out of the
impending European war. Support of isolation was impossible,
this being an unrealistic view of the American position in
the world. Efforts to advance collective security agreements
were by 1939, obviously, failures. The nations involved had
never had any real unanimity, other than appeasement, among
themselves on how to proceed with Germany.
T

Nation, in early 1939, feared that the German

fascist terror in Europe was a menace to democracy
everywhere. This apprehension expressed in the journal,
would eventually evolve during the next six months into a
more concrete fear for the United States. At first, The
Nation's trepidation was expressed in the most general
terms. Democracy and fascism could not survive together. One
would finally destroy the other. If it was not to be the
destruction of democracy, then fascism must be destroyed.
8S Ibid .
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"They cannot survive together, either in the same hemisphere
or ultimately in the same world; the world is too small and
fascism is too implacable.

,,86 By September 1939,

Americans, according to The Nation, recognized that the
defense of England and France was vital to the survival of
democracy. A potential defeat of both of these countries
would insure U.S. involvement in the war. The commitment of
the United States would come about "because their survival
is fatally bound up with the hope of freedom on our
continent as in the whole world.,,87 The Nation's reasoning
for aid to England and France was now linked directly to
American security. With the beginning of the war in Europe
in 1939, the argument concerning economic aid became more
cogent; it was the one possible solution that could keep
Americans out of the war. "[fd]e shall have to aid England
and France by all means short of war. Defeat for the Allies
would seriously undermine American security.,,88 If Hitler
defeated England and France, he would then be at the very
door of America. Due to Hitler's past record, Americans
could not be certain that Nazi Germany would not attack.
Hitler's record of past assurances gave The Nation no hope.
86
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"Hitler is a liar.

[E]very reason Hitler gave for

going to war--were merely pretexts [

]

.

His fantastic

dream of conquering the world is his only truth.

,,89

Though the bulk of this paper is centered on 1933 to
1939, it is necessary at this point to look forward to 1939
and 1941 to see if

ation was consistent in its reaction

to Hitler. Was the journal's response to Hitler influenced
by the non-aggression pact in 1939 or Germany's declaration
of war against the Soviet Union in June 1941? As Freda
Kirchwey and others at the weekly had incorporated the
Soviets in their stance on collective security and were
supportive of them, it is important to discover if The
was swayed by what happened with the USSR.
Just before the beginning of the European war in
1939, Germany concluded a non aggression pact with the
Soviet Union. The Nation, though startled by Soviet
alignment with Hitler, could not accept Stalin's actions.
The journal editorialized "that the Moscow-Berlin axis is a
solid and menacing fact.

.,,90 Though expedience probably

provided the motivation for the pact, the journal could not
believe there would be a continued alliance. "[T]he longrange ambitions of Stalin and Hitler are bound to clash.

89"Hl'tler's CaleD.f]'3r,"
The ;'a
Nt'lon 149 (S ep t em b er 9 •
~
1939):261-62.
90Freda Kirchwey, "Moscow-Berlin Axis," (Editorial)
The Nation 147 (October 7, 1939):365.
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Behind the ideologies of the two countries lie older and
deeper conflict.,,91 Even though The Nation could minimize
Soviet purges in its continual advancement of collectivism,
the weekly was not able to accept Soviet defection to a
German alliance. The German-Soviet pact did not cause The
Nation to alter its view toward German fascism in favor of
~oscow.

The determination of the journal to oppose Hitler

can, in addition, be seen in the weekly's analysis of
Hitler's attack on Russia. The Nation advocated support for
the Western democracies in opposition to Hitler in 1940,
long before the Soviet Union entered the war on the Allies
side. Again and again the weekly stressed the one issue of
paramount importance in the war,

the destruction of Hitler

because he threatened everyone. The Nation insisted that
it is not an issue which can be blurred by the
ideological backtracking of the Communists or the past
mistakes and treacheries of the Soviet Govern~ent.
Hitler must be defeated and destroyed, not because he
was in league with Stalin or because he is fighting
Stalin today, but because he represents the one
overwhelming menace to the We~5ern democracies and to
freedo~ throughout the world.
The Nation never wavered in its fear of Hitler and
its devotion to his ruin. The journal believed the threat
from the Nazis put democracy and the very continuance of
civilization in jeopardy. Everything else assumed little

91 Ibid ., p. 366.
92Freda Kirchwey, "We Have But One Aim," (Editorial)
The Nation 152 (June 28, 1941):740.

112
importance next to its desire for the complete annihilation
of Hitler and his regime.
Americans continued to want to stay out of the
European war, according to The N tion, but they did not want
to remain totally neutral. American interests lay with
France and England; nevertheless, the United States did not
want to send an army to Europe. Again, there was only one
possible solution supported by the journal.
Our chance of staying out of the war depends in great
part on the amount of equipment we can ship to Britain
and France.
. The more guns we send and the sooner
we send them, the better §~e chance that we shall not
have to send men as well.
The only hold out in American aid to Europe was U.S.
troops. Even this was to eventually fall by the wayside in
The Nation's stance on the war. By mid 1940, the journal's
attitude had evolved further. It came out in support of
universal military service (conscription) as the "first
program for a democratic defense.

,,94

The Nation's support of universal military service
and its "abandonment" of pacifism caused the former editor
and owner, Oswald Garrison Villard, to resign. The rift
between the editors and the former owner had grown too
large. He could not accept the changes that had taken place
in The Nation's attitude toward American involvement in the
93Freda Kirchwey, "What Americans Hant," p. 308.
94Freda Kirchwey, itA Democratic Program of Defense,1t
(Editorial) Th Nation 150 (June 15, 1940):723.
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war. The weekly's IIdesertion of pacifism" and absolute
morals violated his persistent belief in a liberal
ideology.95 Villard regretted his leaving, but it was
necessary as it tlhas been precipitated at this time by the
editors' abandonment of The Nation's steadfast opposition to
all preparations for war, to universal military service, to
a great navy, and to all war.
The Nation was frightened by many well-intentioned
people, which in the weekly's opinion included Villard, who
recognized the nature of the horror facing democracy but
seemed to believe that the terrible conditions in Europe
were !lour concern only if we choose to make them so,II97 The
journal viewed this kind of belief as "a retreat from the
grimmest reality that has confronted our nation in many
generations.

,,98 Pacifism, according to The Nation, had

become appeasement. The weekly never supported appeasement.
Those who continued to support pacifism believed the United
States could continue to exist independent and free with a

950swald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men:
Valedictory," The Nati
150 (June 29, 194 0):782.
96 Ibid •
97

Freda Kirchwey, "Escape and Appeasement,"
(Editorial) The N ion 150 (June 29, 1940):773. Kirchwey's
words in this-Quotat on are almost the same words that
Villard used in a previous issue about potential American
involvement in the war. This was meant to be a dig at
Villard.
98 Ibid •
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Europe dominated by Hitler and the Nazis. For example, The
Nation reacted negatively to the position of another liberal
publication, The New Republic. This

vJas

because it "promised

to stand resolutely against any moral urge that might carry
us into war because it knew so certainly that the 'evils of
a system' could not be cured by 'killing the unfortunate
individuals who for a moment embody the system' .,,99 The
journal sarcastically responded to such a naive outmoded
view of reality, which could literally endanger American
liberties and security. "It [The New Republic] failed to
tell us that the individuals who for the moment embody a
system might possibly fasten a system of slavery upon us
which would not be for the moment.,,100 The Nation could not
support the supposition that the Nazis would not bother the
U.S. The journal no longer understood the defeat of Nazism
to be a program to defend the unfortunate victims of Nazi
aggression. The Nation now believed the defeat of Hitler was
a much more vital issue. The very survival of the United
States and democracy were at stake. The U.S. had to become
involved in a "stouthearted resistance" as a necessary
protection of America's security.101 The old order no longer
99Reinhold Niebuhr, "An End to Illusions," The
Nat ion 150 (J u n e 29, 1940 ) : 7 7 8. AI tho ugh the rei s n-oevidence that The Nation responded to The New Republic on
other issues,
t certainly did so in this case.
100 Ib 1"d

••

p.

779.

101Freda Kirchwey, "Escape and Appeasement," p. 774.
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existed. Pacifism, collective action, and liberal principles
no longer held the same meaning in a world that was rapidly
changing. Th

Nation saw these changes, feared the

consequences, and realized that people's blind faith in
morality and the goodness of men could lead to the world's
destruction.

102

Hitler himself changed The Nation's views of

the world. Because of Hitler's actions and the
ineffectiveness of the policies of European countries
dealing with Hitler,

the weekly believed the United States

would eventually be threatened by German foreign policy. The
Nation was able to evolve with the changing circumstances
and so progressed from a view of pacifism to a position of
militant liberalism.

79.

102Reinhold Niebuhr, "An End to Illusions," p. 778-

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
It should be no surprise to anyone who read The
Nation in the 1930s that its liberalism would bring it into
continual conflict with Hitler's regime. The weekly was
concerned with what happened in Germany as Hitler took over
the reigns of power. It was also concerned for the rest of
Europe as Hitler's despotism spread. German workers, women,
and intellectuals knew a harsh life under Nazism. Jews,
liberals, and leftists were hounded into exile or death. The
rights of individuals were destroyed first in Germany, and
finally in the rest of Europe as each country came under
Nazi domination. Traditional ways of life and cultures were
uprooted, torn apart, and discarded by a tyranny that
acknowledged no boundary lines in Europe. Hitler, in
striving to conquer the rest of the continent and create a
pan-Germanic empire, unleashed methods of slaughter and
terrorism unprecedented in world history. The Nation could
not accept the supposition that the terrible events taking
place in Europe were not the concern of Americans. Not only
was it America's concern, it was also the duty of the U.S.
to become involved. This did not mean that T

Nation wished

America to become entangled in a foreign war. As soon as the
116
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journal realized the coming war was not simply a foreign
adventure but that the preservation of democracy was
inextricably bound to Global affairs; it had to recommend
American support for the besieged nations of Europe. In
1917, liberals in the aftermath of World War I could argue
that freedom and democracy for Americans were not involved
in European affairs. By 1938, it was certain that Hitler's
regime was different; these same terms were in jeopardy.
In some instances, The Nati n's response to German
fascism was naive. When it advocated democracy as the answer
for Austria's dilemma with Germany, this was an unrealistic
view. Dollfuss was able to dispose of the Austrian
socialists in 1934. It is hard to imagine that democrats
would have fared any better than the socialists.
The one amazing discovery made during the research
of Th

Nation's analyses and attitudes was the precision of

its predictions in so many areas. The journal believed
Hitler's foreign policy goals would result in war if the
rest of Europe did not act. The Nation's accuracy concerning
the destruction of the Jews is almost too chilling to
believe. Though the weekly did not go far enough (as who
could) in its description of what was intended for the Jews
under Hitler, its poignant depiction of the Jews' treatment
under the Nazis and its foreshadowing of events to come were
close to the mark. In addition, The Nation published the
horrid reality of the extermination of Jews very early on as
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it tried to force Americans to examine what was happening to
the Jewish people and force a reaction to their
exterminators.
It has been exciting for this writer to read the
analyses of Th

i n. The impact the journal had on its

readership and the influence it had on intellectuals was
essential in molding American opinion. As a leading journal
of liberal opinion in the 1930s, The Nation helped make its
prestigious readership aware of the changing realities
imposed by Hitler's regime. Understanding the positions,
attitudes, and concerns of a liberal periodical such as The
Nation opens up the history of the period. The weekly's
perspective on Hitler, the Nazis, and the rest of Europe
reveals how the 1930s, an era of great stress and hardship,
was interpreted and reacted to by one segment of American
society--the liberals. The Nation, in addition, can be
understood as the conscience of the United States. Americans
may not have listened or paid any attention to the weekly's
efforts, but The Nation certainly can be applauded for its
crusade. Indirectly, through intellectuals and policy
makers, it endeavored to influence and awaken a sleeping
giant, the American public, to the nature of Hitler, the
Nazis and the resultant plight and horrors for all Europeans
who were affected by the Third Reich.
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